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RIPENESS OF SELF-INCRIMINATION
CLAUSE DISPUTES
MICHAEL J. ZYDNEY MANNHEIMER*
Historically, disputes regarding witnesses' claims pursuant to the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment,1 regardless of the varying
contexts in which they arise, have been resolved at the time each claim is
made. Thus, for example, where a witness before a Congressional
committee is asked a question she believes calls for an incriminatory
response, and the committee disagrees, the witness typically will refuse to
answer and the committee can commence a contempt proceeding against
her. In such a proceeding, the court will resolve the Self-Incrimination
Clause dispute because the witness' claim of the constitutional privilege, if
valid, will provide her a complete defense to the contempt charge.
Similarly, a person who suffers a legal detriment because he refuses to
provide incriminating information to the government in a less formalized
setting will often bring an action challenging the -government's right to
impose the detriment upon him because it amounts to compulsion to
incriminate himself. Again, the court will resolve the Self-Incrimination
Clause dispute to determine whether the invoker's 2 rights have been
violated.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University. J.D. 1994, Columbia Law School. E-mail: mannheimeml@nku.edu. Many
thanks to Mark Godsey and John Valauri for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article. I dedicate this article to Janet, the love of my life, who has never allowed me to
"take the Fifth."
1 "No person shall.., be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Clause has been held to bind the States as well as
the federal government via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). This article assumes such incorporation was proper
and that the Clause applies equally to State and federal action. But see George C. Thomas
III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and
Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 221 (2001) (arguing persuasively that different
standards should govern with respect to the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of
Rights depending on whether federal or State action is at issue).
2 This article often uses the term "invoker" to refer to the person who invokes, or could
invoke, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. See Robert Heidt, The
1261
MICHAEL J. ZYDNEY MANNHEIMER
Yet, three Terms ago, in Chavez v. Martinez, a majority of the
Supreme Court held that the Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated
unless and until a person's compelled self-incriminatory words are actually
used against him in a criminal judicial proceeding. 3  This throws into
question the historic practice of addressing Self-Incrimination Clause issues
without regard for the procedural posture of the particular case. If a
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause is not complete until a person has
been required to be a "witness against himself' "in [a] criminal case," then,
arguably, neither of the disputes mentioned above should be decided at all
because neither is ripe for review.
The Court has not yet come to terms with a ripeness requirement with
respect to claims of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
For example, in the Term before Chavez was decided, the Court considered
the claim of a state prisoner that by requiring his admission of guilt in a
prison program for sex offenders, on pain of expulsion from the program
and the imposition of less desirable conditions of confinement, the State
violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.4 Though the
Court ultimately rejected the claim, it did so on the ground that the prisoner
had not experienced compulsion sufficient to make out a violation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause.5 None of the nine Members of the Court
considered the possibility that the claim should have been rejected because
the plaintiff had never been a "witness against himself' "in [a] criminal
case," and therefore the claim was not ripe for review. Likewise, subsequent
to Chavez, in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Nevada statute requiring individuals to identify
themselves when asked to do so by the police.6 The Court rejected the
claim that the statute violated the Self-Incrimination Clause, reasoning that
mere disclosure of one's name ordinarily "present[s] no reasonable danger
of incrimination.",7 The dissenters 8 strongly disagreed, arguing that "[a]
Conjurer's Circle - The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1066
(1982).
3 See 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.); id. at 777 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
4 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30-32 (2002) (plurality opinion).
5 See id at 35 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and
Thomas, JJ.); id. at 48-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
6 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
7 1d. at 2460.
8 Although Justice Stevens wrote only for himself, three other Justices, who dissented
primarily on Fourth Amendment grounds, indicated their basic agreement with Justice
Stevens' Self-Incrimination Clause analysis as well. See id at 2465 (Breyer, J., joined by
Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) ("There are sound reasons rooted in Fifth Amendment
1262 [Vol. 95
2005] RIPENESS OF SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE DISPUTES 1263
person's identity obviously bears informational and incriminating worth."9
Again, however, none of the Justices considered the possibility that, since
the defendant had never been a "witness against himself' "in [a] criminal
case," the issue was unripe pursuant to the principles enunciated in Chavez.
Since the Burger Court era, the Court has been quite stringent in
enforcing the requirement that any dispute10 be ripe for review in order to
satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the
Constitution. 1 In the Self-Incrimination Clause context, however, the
Court has failed to perceive its own gradual slippage from deciding
concrete cases to deciding those in which the actual danger of a violation of
the Clause, properly understood, is remote at best. This slippage is largely
a result of the Court's failure to distinguish between claims of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination litigated after a criminal
conviction, on the one hand, from those litigated in the investigatory stage
of a criminal matter and those arising in contexts wholly unrelated to
criminal matters, on the other.
This article argues that, in light of the renewed understanding of the
Self-Incrimination Clause exemplified by Chavez, the federal courts should
refuse to address disputes over the validity of claims of the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination unless there is at least an imminent
danger that a person's words will be used against her in a criminal judicial
proceeding.' 2 Part I examines the elementary rules that govern a claim of
considerations for adhering to this Fourth Amendment legal condition circumscribing police
authority to stop an individual against his will.") (citing id. at 2461-64 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
9 Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 "Dispute" is used broadly here, as the ripeness doctrine has been applied not only to
claims but also to defenses, in criminal cases as well as civil. See, e.g., United States v.
Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 57-60 (2d Cir. 2002) (considering ripeness of defendants' pre-trial
claim that Federal Death Penalty Act is unconstitutional).
11 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
12 This article's focus is limited to claims of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination that ultimately make their way into federal court. This is because the ripeness
requirement, like all justiciability requirements stemming from the federal Constitution,
binds only the federal courts and does not apply even to a state court when considering a
federal claim. See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2
(1988) (citation omitted) ("[T]he special limitations that Article III of the Constitution
imposes on the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state courts. The
States are thus left free as a matter of their own procedural law to determine whether their
courts may issue advisory opinions or to determine matters that would not satisfy the more
stringent requirement in the federal courts that an actual 'case' or 'controversy' be presented
for resolution."); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) ("We do not undertake
to say that a state court may not render an opinion on a federal constitutional question even
under such circumstances that it can be regarded only as advisory."). Several prominent
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the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in all varieties of
settings, ranging from those in which the invoker of the privilege has
already had her words used against her in a criminal proceeding, to those in
which there is not even a hint that this will ever occur. Part II discusses
Chavez v. Martinez, which, for the first time, held that a Self-Incrimination
Clause violation occurs only if and when a person's compelled statements
are used against her in a criminal proceeding, and then discusses the
conflict between Chavez and the courts' historic practice of addressing
disputes over claims of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination before a criminal prosecution is initiated. Part III examines
the ripeness doctrine in general terms, and then argues that the Court must
take the ripeness requirement more seriously in Self-Incrimination Clause
cases. This Part re-examines the various types of Self-Incrimination Clause
disputes with ripeness in mind and proposes a framework for deciding
whether each type presents a ripe controversy. It argues that the Self-
Incrimination Clause is similar to its Fifth Amendment neighbor, the
Takings Clause, in this respect: there is no absolute right to silence pursuant
to the Self-Incrimination Clause just as there is no absolute right to property
pursuant to the Takings Clause. Thus, an individual faced with the decision
whether to incriminate himself or herself is in the same position as one
whose property has been taken. Each must await further government
action-the initiation of criminal proceedings in the one case and the
refusal to pay just compensation in the other-before the issue is ripe for
review.
I. SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the Self-Incrimination Clause
has addressed claims that arise in a variety of contexts. On one end of the
spectrum, the Court has addressed claims of the constitutional privilege
commentators, beginning with Paul Freund, have argued that this rule is incorrect and that
state courts ought to be bound by federal justiciability standards when considering federal
claims. See Paul Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term-Foreword: The Year of the Steel
Case, 66 HARv. L. REV. 89, 95 (1952). See generally William A. Fletcher, The "Case or
Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 263 (1990); William P. Murphy, Supreme Court Review of Abstract State Court
Decisions on Federal Law: A Justiciability Analysis, 25 ST. LoUIs U. L.J. 473 (1981); see
also Jonathan D. Varat, Variable Justiciability and the Duke Power Case, 58 TEX. L. REV.
273, 311-12 & nn. 174, 176 (1980). If so, then the principles suggested in this article would
have much broader application. Such a question is, however, beyond the scope of this
article. Of course, nothing prevents the States from adopting their own justiciability rules
that mirror those that constrain federal court jurisdiction, and at least some have done so.
See Nicole A Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59
NoTREDAME L. REV. 1145, 1154-56 (1984).
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against self-incrimination litigated after a criminal conviction of the person
whose compelled statements have been used against him or her at trial. At
the other end, the Court has addressed Self-Incrimination Clause disputes
arising in contexts where the threat of criminal prosecution is, at best,
remote. The Court has consistently ignored these distinctions and resolved
these different types of disputes by applying principles universally
applicable to all, on the assumption that the Clause is violated at the time
that self-incriminating statements are compelled.
A. THE VARYING CONTEXTS IN WHICH SELF-INCRIMINATION
CLAUSE DISPUTES ARE LITIGATED
The Supreme Court has addressed disputes regarding the Self-
Incrimination Clause both before and after a criminal prosecution has taken
place. In both categories of cases, the dispute can arise in a variety of
settings: before a grand jury; before a Congressional committee; before an
administrative agency or other analogous governmental body; and in a civil
action.
1. After the Initiation of a Criminal Prosecution
Even if one knew nothing about Self-Incrimination Clause
jurisprudence, one could easily guess that the Supreme Court would have
had occasion to address Self-Incrimination Clause disputes after a criminal
prosecution and conviction. The core of the Self-Incrimination Clause
concerns the defendant who claims to have been "compelled... to be a
witness against himself," leading to his conviction of a criminal charge, in
violation of the Clause. Only in very rare cases does the compulsion itself
occur at trial, since the core meaning of the Clause has been clear to actors
in the criminal justice system for some time: no defendant can be required
to testify at his or her own criminal trial. Thus, the compulsion and the
"witnessing" typically occur at two different times, the former prior to trial
and the latter at trial. One way in which the compulsion does occur at trial
is where the government does not directly force the defendant to testify, but
indirectly pressures him to do so by commenting on his silence at trial,
making the decision to remain silent "costly."'1 3
More often, the purported compulsion will have occurred before trial
but the Self-Incrimination Clause dispute will not have been fully litigated
until after a prosecution has been initiated. For example, the putative
defendant will have made disclosures to a state or federal grand jury, and a
prosecutor will attempt to use those disclosures against her at a criminal
13 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
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trial. The Supreme Court has long addressed Self-Incrimination Clause
disputes arising in this way.14 Sometimes, the dispute arises because the
putative defendant has arguably been compelled to provide disclosures in a
civil action and those disclosure are later used to prosecute her for a
crime.1 5 In other cases, the dispute arises because the putative defendant
has arguably been compelled to make disclosures before an administrative
agency to which she has been subpoenaed, and, again, a prosecutor then
seeks to use the evidence against her in a criminal prosecution. 16 And in
some cases, an arguably compelled disclosure made before a Congressional
or other legislative committee is later used against the defendant in a
criminal prosecution. 17
Finally, Self-Incrimination Clause disputes often arise in less formal
settings. These are analogous to the cases in which testimony has arguably
been compelled before an administrative agency. However, the
"proceeding" is an informal one and the body requesting the information
has neither subpoena power nor contempt power, although less formally
recognized persuasive forces are at work. For example, the Court has
addressed whether statements induced by a state probation officer, during a
compulsory meeting, could properly be used against the probationer at a
subsequent criminal trial, 18 and whether disclosures made on a mandatory
federal income tax return were properly used against the taxpayer to convict
him of a criminal charge. 19 In perhaps the most common type of case
falling into this category, the defendant claims that a confession was
coerced from him by the police and that confession is later used against him
at trial, thereby making the suspect an unwilling "witness against himself'
"in [a] criminal case."2 °  The Supreme Court has long addressed such
14 See Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1913); see also New Jersey v.
Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 451-52 (1979); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 183-85
(1977); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 426 (1943).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1970) (interrogatories in federal
civil condemnation proceeding); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 256 (1966)
(disclosures in federal tax proceedings); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 488-89
(1944) (testimony in state bankruptcy proceeding).
16 See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 494-95 (1967) (testimony before state
attorney general); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 141-45 (1949) (testimony before
federal Office of Price Administration).
17 See, e.g., Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 179-80 (1954).
18 See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 422-25 (1984).
19 See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 649-50 (1976).
20 1 have argued elsewhere that where coercion is used by governmental officials to
extract a confession, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures is violated, and when the confession is used at trial against the defendant, the Self-
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claims, starting in 1897 with Brain v. United States.21 With its Miranda
jurisprudence,2 z the Court has created a distinct doctrinal line to address the
problem of the inherently coercive nature of the interrogation room and has
grounded that doctrinal line squarely in the Self-Incrimination Clause.23
2. Before (or Unrelated to) the Initiation of a Criminal Prosecution
Very often, the courts will address Self-Incrimination Clause disputes
before a criminal prosecution is instituted. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the privilege can apply in any setting, not only in a
"criminal case." As the Court wrote in McCarthy v. Arndstein:
The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which
the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal
proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him
who gives it. The zrivilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also
a party defendant.
Using as a springboard its statement in McCarthy that the Fifth
Amendment privilege "applies" in settings other than criminal proceedings,
the Court has gone further and concluded that the Self-Incrimination Clause
"'privileges [the witness] not to answer official questions put to him in
any.., proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. '
25
Thus, the Court has generally assumed, at least until recently, 26 that the
Self-Incrimination Clause protects two separate and distinct rights. Aside
Incrimination Clause is violated. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions
and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 60-61 (2002).
2 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Two earlier cases addressed the issue of the use of allegedly
coerced confessions against a defendant in a criminal case, but these cases did not cite the
Fifth Amendment and may have treated the issue as raising merely sub-constitutional
evidentiary questions. See Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355, 357 (1896); Hopt v. Utah,
110 U.S. 574, 583-87 (1884).
22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23 See Mannheimer, supra note 20, at 69-72.
24 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); accord Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 464 (1975); see also
E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29-34 (1949)
(noting that the privilege applies in legislative and administrative bodies); Note,
Applicability of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legislative Investigations, 49
COLUM. L. REv. 87, 89 (1949) (noting that application of the privilege has been extended to
forfeiture, bankruptcy, and other civil proceedings).
25 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 77 (1973)); accordKastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,461 (1972) (writing that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "usually operates to allow a citizen
to remain silent when asked a question requiring an incriminatory answer").
26 See infra Part II.A.
MICHAEL J. ZYDNEY MANNHEIMER
from protecting against the possibility of a person's compelled statements
being used against him or her in a criminal judicial proceeding,27 the Clause
"also is operative before criminal proceedings are instituted; it bars the
government from using compulsion to obtain incriminating information
from any person.,
28
Thus, in case of a dispute over a claim of the constitutional privilege,
the parties need not, under current law, wait until after a criminal
prosecution is initiated for resolution of the dispute. Instead, once the
dispute arises, the parties can have it resolved in court, often in a contempt
proceeding. In United States v. Mandjuano, the Supreme Court outlined the
typical procedure when the dispute arises in the grand jury, though the
description is equally applicable to other fora:
If the witness interposes his privilege, the grand jury has two choices. If the desired
testimony is of marginal value, the grand jury can pursue other avenues of inquiry; if
the testimony is thought sufficiently important, the grand jury can seek a judicial
determination as to the bona fides of the witness' Fifth Amendment claim, in which
case the witness must satisfy the presiding judge that the claim of privilege is not a
subterfuge. If in fact there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness
from his being compelled to answer, the prosecutor must then determine whether the
answer is of such overriding importance as to justify a grant of immunity to the
witness.
29
Where the contempt court has found a good faith basis for the claim of
the constitutional privilege, and "[i]f immunity is sought by the prosecutor
and granted by the presiding judge, the witness can then be compelled to
answer, on pain of contempt, even though the testimony would implicate
the witness in criminal activity. 30
If, on the other hand, the presiding judge feels there is no justification
for the claim of privilege, the grand jury witness will be held in contempt.
Then, the grand jury witness has two options. If she stands in contempt,
27 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he
core protection afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause is a prohibition on compelling a
criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial.").
28 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 327 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976) ("I[T]he privilege
protects against the use of compelled statements as well as guarantees the right to remain
silent absent immunity."); Maness, 419 U.S. at 461 (writing that privilege "assure[s] that an
individual is not compelled to produce evidence which later may be used against him as an
accused in a criminal action"); see also Michael Edmund O'Neill, The Fifth Amendment in
Congress: Revisiting the Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEO. L.J. 2445,
2472 (2002) ("[I]n the Court's view, any time the government compels testimony in any sort
of official proceeding, the Fifth Amendment is violated .... ").
29 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976) (quotations and citations omitted).
30 Id.
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again, the grand jury will not obtain the needed information and she will be
punished as a contemnor. On the other hand, the grand jury witness can
usually purge herself of the contempt by then providing the requested
testimony.31 However, if she does, it is not at all clear that she can later
challenge the admissibility of that testimony in a criminal trial on the
ground that she was compelled to provide it on pain of contempt.32
The courts address with some frequency the validity of such a claim of
the constitutional privilege outside the confines of a criminal prosecution.
For example, as noted above, a grand jury witness may claim the privilege
and refuse to answer questions and a dispute arises over whether the
privilege is properly claimed. The dispute can take a number of forms. 33
For example, the questioner and the grand jury witness might disagree over
whether the question truly calls for a response that might incriminate the
witness. 3 4 Also, the grand jury witness might be granted immunity, and the
disagreement is over whether the immunity conferred is broad enough to
supplant the constitutional privilege, thereby requiring that the witness
answer. 35 A third dispute can arise over whether the government has acted
with compulsion, such as by attaching a penalty or the deprivation of a
benefit to a claim of the constitutional privilege.36 Finally, the dispute can
be over whether the grand jury witness has adequately apprised the grand
jury of her intention to rely on the privilege. 7
Similarly, as noted above, the Self-Incrimination Clause dispute can
arise when a person has been called before an administrative agency or
analogous body and is asked potentially incriminatory questions. Again,
the dispute can arise where the questioner and the invoker disagree over
31 See id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If the invocation of the
privilege is disallowed, the putative defendant will then have the opportunity to answer the
question posed prior to the imposition of sanctions for contempt.") (citing Garner, 424 U.S.
at 663). Obviously, she can also appeal the contempt citation.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 133-46.
33 The types of disputes discussed do not exhaust the possibilities of disputes that can
arise under the Self-Incrimination Clause. These four, however, in one form or another,
appear to be the most common.
34 See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 482 (1951); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159, 160-61 (1950); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 363-67 (1917);
Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186, 195 (1906).
35 See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972); Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 424-26 (1956); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 372-74 (1905);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 548-60 (1892).
36 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805-06 (1977); Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973); Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 238 (1966).
37 See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951); United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424,427 (1943).
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whether: the question actually calls for an incriminatory response;3 8 the
immunity conferred is broad enough to replace the constitutional privilege
and require the invoker to answer;3 9 compulsion has been utilized by the
government;40 or the invoker has effectively waived the constitutional
privilege by failing to claim it.4 1 Again, this dispute is often resolved in
court prior to the initiation of any criminal prosecution.
Likewise, it is sometimes the case that a person is called before a
Congressional or state legislative committee and a Self-Incrimination
Clause dispute arises. Obviously, the same issues can arise in such a
context.42 Once again, the dispute is often resolved in court at the time it
arises, in advance of "any criminal case."
Finally, the dispute can arise in a civil case, in which a litigant is
ordered by the court, in the course of discovery, to make potentially self-
incriminating disclosures. Again, the same issues can arise.43 And again,
the dispute is often fully litigated before there is any hint of a criminal
prosecution. As the Court held in United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia,
one of the oldest cases addressing compelled self-incrimination, "[t]he rule
38 See, e.g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 77-79 (1965)
(required registration with Attorney General); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149, 154 (1923) (deportation proceedings).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 603-04 (1971) (requirement that gun
owner register with Internal Revenue Service); Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79-81; Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 53-54 & n.2 (1964) (testimony before special bi-state
investigatory commission); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 146-49 (1931)
(testimony before Internal Revenue Service agent).
40 See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30-32 (2002) (plurality opinion) (statements
made as part of prison sex offender treatment program); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.
Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285-86 (1998) (testimony before clemency board); Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1976) (testimony before prison disciplinary board);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 512-13 (1967) (hearing before state "Judicial Inquiry").
41 See, e.g., Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1968) (registration of firearm);
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 63-65 (1968) (payment of taxes); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 40-43 (1968) (payment of taxes and registration with Internal Revenue
Service); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3, 6 (1964) (testimony compelled before state inquiry
conducted by "referee" appointed by state court); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm'r
of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927) (testimony before immigration agent).
42 See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 192-94 (1955) (dispute over whether
witness properly claimed privilege); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 157-60 (1955)
(same).
43 See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 450-54 (1975) (in suit for injunctive relief
against purveyor of pornography, where self-incriminatory matter was subpoenaed, dispute
arose as to likelihood of future prosecution); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)
(holding that the privilege applies in federal bankruptcy proceedings).
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clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery [in a civil case]
which would expose him to penalties. 44
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
DISPUTES
A number of principles emerge from the cases addressing whether a
claim of the constitutional privilege has been properly made, regardless of
the setting. This article focuses on three of those principles. First, the
invoker of the constitutional privilege must affirmatively claim the privilege
in order to take advantage of it. Second, in order for the sought-after
information to be deemed incriminatory as to the invoker, the threat of
future prosecution must be real and not speculative. Finally, although the
courts must grant the invoker considerable leeway in determining whether a
question calls for an incriminatory response, the courts, and not the invoker
herself, must be the ultimate arbiter.
1. The Requirement That the Invoker Claim the Constitutional Privilege
at the Time the Incriminatory Response is Called For
One rule that has emerged from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
the Self-Incrimination Clause is that the invoker must claim the Fifth
Amendment privilege at the time the incriminatory response is called for.45
Thus, if the would-be invoker simply refuses to answer the question without
giving a reason, or gives a reason other than the constitutional privilege, she
is automatically subject to punishment for contempt, irrespective of whether
a proper claim of that privilege would have been valid.46 In addition, if,
instead of claiming the constitutional privilege, she testifies falsely, she is
liable for perjury, even if a claim of that privilege at the time would have
44 26 U.S. 100, 104 (1828); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886)
("[O]ne cardinal rule of the court of chancery is never to decree a discovery which might
tend to convict the party of a crime, or to forfeit his property.").
" There are narrow exceptions to this rule. For example, if the government attaches a
penalty to the assertion of the constitutional privilege itself, the invoker need not claim it in
order to preserve a later claim that she has been compelled to speak. See Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434-35 (1984). In addition, the requirement of a timely objection is
excused in those rare instances where requiring an assertion of the constitutional privilege is
tantamount to "oblig[ing] [one] 'to prove guilt to avoid admitting it."' Marchetti, 390 U.S.
at 50 (quoting United States v. Kahringer, 345 U.S. 22, 34 (1953)).
46 See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1951) (holding a claim of
constitutional privilege invalid where witness gave different reason upon refusal to answer
and claimed that privilege as "pure afterthought" only the following day when given
opportunity to purge herself of contempt).
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been proper.47 Moreover, if the putative invoker answers without making a
claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege, she cannot "unring the bell": she
cannot take her answer back, and retroactively claim that privilege.48
Similarly, where "criminating facts have been voluntarily revealed, the
privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details."49 And once
information is divulged, either without proper objection or because the
objection has come too late, it may be used by the authorities for any
purpose, including direct evidence of the invoker's guilt at a subsequent
criminal trial.5 °
These requirements, the Court has reasoned, strike the appropriate
balance between "the Fifth Amendment privilege and the generally
applicable principle that governments have the right to everyone's
testimony.' If the subject of the inquiry does not object, the government
may not know that it is about to elicit arguably incriminatory testimony.
Whether a seemingly innocuous question might lead to incriminating
testimony is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of that person, and
she must put the government on notice that this is so if she is to preserve
her claim that her answer was compelled. 2
Thus, in United States v. Monia, the defendants had been subpoenaed
before a grand jury and gave testimony without ever claiming the
constitutional privilege. 3 They were later indicted for crimes relating to
their testimony.54 They argued that the indictment should be dismissed, but
the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the defendants voluntarily
47 See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178 (1977).
48 See Rogers, 340 U.S. at 371 (holding that witness not permitted "to select any stopping
place in the testimony"); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S.
103, 113 (1927) ("The privilege may not be relied on and must be deemed waived, if not in
some manner fairly brought to the attention of the tribunal which must pass upon it.");
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896) ("[If the witness himself elects to waive his
privilege ... and discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop, but must go
on and make a full disclosure.").
4' Rogers, 340 U.S. at 373; see also Note, Testimonial Waiver of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1752, 1753 (1979).
50 See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 665 (1976) ("[S]ince Garner made
disclosures instead of claiming the privilege on his tax returns [h]e... was foreclosed from
invoking the privilege when such information was later introduced as evidence against him
in a criminal prosecution."); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 (1970) (holding that the
defendant's "failure at any time to assert the constitutional privilege" when answering
interrogatories in civil matter "leaves him in no position to complain now that he was
compelled to give testimony against himself").
51 Garner, 424 U.S. at 655.
52 Id.
53 317 U.S. 424, 426 (1943).
54 See id.
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testified and therefore were not "compelled":' "The amendment speaks of
compulsion. It does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in
matters which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he desires the protection
of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been
'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." 55
2. The Minimal Need for Concreteness of the Threat of a Future
Prosecution
It is well settled that in order for a person to claim the Fifth
Amendment privilege, the threat that she ultimately will be prosecuted
based on her disclosures must be real and concrete, not imaginary or
speculative. The definitive exposition of this rule comes from the English
case of Regina v. Boyes:
[T]he danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the
ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things-not a danger of an
imaginary and insubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and
barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to
influence his conduct. We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of the
ordinary course of the law and such as no reasonable man would be affected by,
should not be suffered to obstruct the administration of justice .... [I]t would be to
convert a salutary protection into a means of abuse if it were to be held that a mere
imaginary possibility of danger, however remote and improbable was sufficient to
justify the withholding of evidence essential to the ends ofjustice.i
Early in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the Self-Incrimination
Clause, it adopted this rationale to limit the reach of the Clause. Thus, in
Brown v. Walker, in upholding a federal immunity statute for the first time,
the Court quoted this passage at length.5 7  It reasoned that the Self
Incrimination Clause "presupposes a legal detriment to the witness arising
from" his disclosures, and that if no criminal prosecution were possible
55 Id. at 427; see also Garner, 424 U.S. at 654 ("[I]n the ordinary case, if a witness under
compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government
has not 'compelled' him to incriminate himself."); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367,
370 (1951) ("If [the witness] desired the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination, she was required to claim it."); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147
(1949). Again, there are exceptions to this rule. See supra note 45.
56 Regina v. Boyes, 1 Best & S. 311, 330-31 (1861); see also United States v. Freed, 401
U.S. 601, 603-04 (1971) (holding that where person supplying personal information might
be implicated in future crimes, "the claimant is not confronted by 'substantial and real' but
merely 'trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination"') (quoting Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968)).
17 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896).
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because immunity was granted, the Clause does not prohibit compulsion to
make the disclosures.58
In most cases, the Court has been willing to presume that if a
disclosure would implicate the witness in activity that is actually addressed
by a criminal statute, the mere possibility of prosecution is sufficient to
render the putative response incriminatory. 59 The Court has sometimes
characterized "the test [a]s whether the testimony might later subject the
witness to criminal prosecution., 60  Thus, in Blau v. United States, the
witness had refused to answer questions before a federal grand jury
regarding whether she was employed by the Communist Party, at a time
when the Smith Act61 forbade knowingly belonging to any organization that
advocated overthrow of the government.62 The Court held that the very
existence of the Smith Act was sufficient to render incriminatory the answer
to the grand jury's question, and that the witness therefore could refuse to
answer.
63
58 Id. at 600, 604; see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 102 (1964)
(White, J., concurring) ("The privilege protects against real dangers, not remote and
speculative possibilities."); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917).
59 But see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428 (1971) (plurality opinion) (conceding
that, where California law required those involved in auto accident to stop and provide vital
information, "there is some possibility of prosecution-often a very real one," but
concluding that "the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong
policies in favor of a disclosure called for by [such) statutes"); cf id. at 448 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that state's statutory scheme "entails genuine risks of
self-incrimination from the driver's point of view").
60 Leflowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977).
6118 U.S.C. § 2385 (2005).
62 340 U.S. 159, 159-61 (1950).
63 See id. at 161; see also Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 97 (1968) ("[A]
prospective registrant realistically can expect that registration will substantially increase the
likelihood of his prosecution."); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70,
77 (1965) ("[M]ere association with the Communist Party presents sufficient threat of
prosecution to support a claim of privilege."); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 200
(1955) (detailing prosecutions pursuant to Smith Act instituted just prior to witness's
appearance before Congressional committee as demonstrating a real danger of prosecution).
O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2517, contends that "prior to the Court's decision in Dennis [v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)], it certainly could not have placed a witness in legal
jeopardy if she answered in the affirmative a question about Communist Party membership."
The argument is untenable. In Dennis, id at 510-11, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge
to the Smith Act based on the First Amendment. Certainly, prospective Smith Act
defendants had much to fear so long as that Act was on the statute books, even before the
Supreme Court put its imprimatur on the Act by declaring its constitutionality.
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3. The Sharing of Responsibility Between Invoker and Judge Regarding
Whether the Invoker's Answer Would be Incriminatory
The final governing principle, related to the second, is that, while the
invoker of the Fifth Amendment privilege must necessarily be afforded
some deference when determining whether a question calls for an
incriminatory response, the courts, and not the invoker herself, must make
the final determination. While the second principle discussed centers on the
possibility of a prosecution, the third focuses on whether, assuming there is
to be a prosecution, the disclosure could be used to prove the case against
the invoker. Early on, the courts acknowledged that too little deference to
the invoker would defeat the purpose of the privilege. Only the invoker
knows what the answer would be, and only she knows why a seemingly
innocuous response might connect her, through a chain of other evidence, to
nefarious activity. Therefore, to require her to disclose precisely why a
question calls for an incriminatory response would require her to make the
very disclosures she fears and which she arguably has a constitutional right
not to make.
This was made clear in what is considered the first important Self-
Incrimination Clause case, United States v. Burr,64 decided only sixteen
years after the adoption of the Clause. Burr was neither a Supreme Court
case nor, strictly speaking, a Self-Incrimination Clause case, since it never
cited the Clause.65 Authored by Chief Justice Marshall sitting as Circuit
Justice, however, the decision in Burr set the standard for later Self-
Incrimination Clause cases in the Supreme Court. A federal grand jury,
considering charges against former Vice-President Aaron Burr, called
Burr's secretary, a Mr. Willie, as a witness to decipher the contents of a
letter in Willie's handwriting.66 Willie refused to answer questions
regarding the letter, arguing that even to admit understanding the contents
or knowing the provenance of the letter could tend to incriminate him in his
boss's illicit scheme.67 Chief Justice Marshall held for the circuit court that
Willie need not answer the questions. In so doing, he established a standard
of broad deference to the witness. The issue for the court is "whether any
direct answer to [the question propounded] can implicate the witness. 68 If
not, then the witness must answer.69 Otherwise, the witness "must be the
64 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692e).
65 See O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2524.
66 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 38.
67 Id. at 38-39.
61 Id. at 40.
69 See id.
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sole judge what his answer would be.",70 If the witness "say upon his oath
that his answer would criminate himself, the court can demand no other
testimony of the fact.",7 1 The reason for this result is simple: for the court to
participate in considering whether the witness's answer would be truly
incriminatory, the witness would have to disclose the answer, at least to the
court; but this would, according to the Burr court, defeat the privilege.72 As
the court wrote:
The court cannot participate with [the witness] in this judgment, because [the court]
cannot decide on the effect of his answer without knowing what it would be; and a
disclosure of that fact to the udges would strip him of the privilege which the law
allows, and which he claims.
However, more recently, the Court has stated that courts must take a
more active role, at least to the extent of determining whether an invoker's
fear of self-incrimination is reasonable. The Court has cited with approval
language from Regina v. Boyes that indicates that such a role is appropriate:
[T]o entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the Court must see,
from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is
called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness
from his being compelled to answer.
74
The Court has also stated that the privilege "protects against any
disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so




73 Id; see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951) ("To sustain the
privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot
be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.").
14 1 Best & S. 311, 329-30 (1861) (emphasis added); see, e.g., United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917)
(quoting Boyes, 1 Best & S. at 329-30); Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186, 195 (1906) ("[W]e
must consider whether we can see reasonable grounds for believing that the book was
privileged.
75 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); accord Hiibel v. Sixth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004) (reiterating that answer is not incriminatory "absent a
reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him"); Maness v. Meyers, 419
U.S. 449, 461 (1975). The Court gave this standard some teeth in Mason. There, before a
grand jury investigating allegations of illegal gambling, the witness had been asked whether
there was a game of cards being played at a table at which he was sitting on a particular
night, and he refused to answer. Mason, 244 U.S. at 363. The Court ruled that the witness
was properly held in contempt because it was no crime "in Alaska to sit at a table where
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invoker must determine whether an answer could be incriminatory, but, if
she does, the court must determine whether such a belief is reasonable
based on the limited information at its disposal.
II. CHA VEZ V MARTINEZ: A NEW VIEW OF THE SELF-
INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
As detailed above, the Court has allowed parties to litigate disputes
arising under the Self-Incrimination Clause not only after a criminal
prosecution has been initiated, but also in advance of any such prosecution,
even when no realistic threat of prosecution has been posed. This position
has been a result of the Court's historic assumption that the Self-
Incrimination Clause gives rise to a right, not only not to have compelled
statements used against their maker, but a distinct and independent right not
to have the government compel one to disclose self-incriminatory
information in the first place. This assumption, however, has been undercut
recently by the Court's first clear holding on the issue in Chavez v.
Martinez.76 The Court held there what it had indicated before only in
dictum 77 and what a good many commentators had argued 78 based on the
cards are being played, or to join in such a game unless played for something of value." Id.
at 367.
76 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
77 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (dictum)
("Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair [the
privilege against self-incrimination], a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.").
78 See Akhil Reed Amar & Renfe B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 869 n.36 (1995) ("[A] Fifth Amendment
violation occurs at the point when compelled testimony is introduced in a criminal case.");
Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 464-65
(2002) ("[U]se of a compelled statement in a criminal case is a necessary precondition for a
violation of the privilege."); George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The
1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEx. L. REv. 231, 261-62 (1988) (distinguishing
between the collection of the confession and its use); Martin R. Gardner, Section 1983
Claims Under Miranda: A Critical View of the Right to Avoid Interrogation, 30 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1277, 1288 (1993) ("A violation [of the Self-Incrimination Clause] does not occur until
the product of... compulsion is used against the suspect, i.e. until she becomes a witness
against herself.") (footnote omitted); Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the
Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally
Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 921 (1989) ("[U]nlike [F]ourth [A]mendment rights,
[F]ifth [Almendment rights are not violated unless and until the statement is used against the
person making it ...."); O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2472 ("[T]he introduction of the
compelled statement may occur 'in' a 'criminal case,' and it is this introduction that violates
the Fift Amendment-not the act of compelling the testimony."); Larry J. Ritchie,
Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L.
REv. 383, 417 n.168 (1977) (noting that person's Self-Incrimination Clause rights violated
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language of the Constitution: that the Clause is violated only if and when a
person's statements are actually used against her in a criminal judicial
proceeding. This signals a sea-change in how the Court views the Self-
Incrimination Clause and throws into question the courts' historic
willingness to address disputes under the Clause prior to the initiation of a
criminal prosecution. Cognizant that its pronouncement might throw much
of its Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence into disarray, the
Chavez Court attempted to explain away the apparent inconsistency.
Unfortunately, the explanation consisted of little more than question-
begging assertions, and Chavez left even more confusion in its wake by
evading the question of the propriety of premature adjudication of Self-
Incrimination Clause disputes.
A. THE DECISION IN CHAVEZ
In Chavez, Martinez and two police officers engaged in a scuffle,
during which Martinez was shot several times, leaving him permanently
blind and paralyzed from the waist down.79 When Martinez was brought to
a local hospital and awaited emergency medical treatment, a third police
officer, Chavez, questioned him for ten minutes over a forty-five-minute
period.8° Martinez pleaded with Chavez that he would not say anything
until he received medical attention, yet Chavez continued the
interrogation.81 During this questioning, Martinez made a number of self-
incriminating statements. 82 Martinez survived the ordeal but was never
prosecuted, so his statements were never used against him in a criminal
proceeding.83 Rather, he brought an action for damages pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, among other things, a violation of his rights
pursuant to the Self-Incrimination Clause, as incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A majority of the Court held that the Self-Incrimination Clause had not
been violated because Martinez's confession was never used against him.
The Court rejected Martinez's contention that the term "criminal case" as
used in the Clause "encompass[es] the entire criminal investigatory process,
only when statements "used against him at trial"); George C. Thomas III, The Poisoned Fruit
of Pretrial Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 413, 426 n.95 (1986) (similar).
79 538 U.S. at 763-64 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.).
80 Id. (plurality opinion).
81 Id. at 783-87 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82 Id. at 764 (plurality opinion).
83 Id. (plurality opinion).
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,,84including police interrogations. Instead, Justice Thomas wrote for a
plurality of four Justices that "a 'criminal case' at the very least requires the
initiation of legal proceedings., 85  Accordingly, the plurality held that
"Martinez was never made to be a 'witness' against himself in violation of
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements
were never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case., 86 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, indicated a
basic agreement with the plurality's reading of "the core of the guarantee
against compelled self-incrimination., 87  A majority of the Court thus
rejected the claim that the Self-Incrimination Clause can be violated before
a person's statements are ever used against him "in [a] criminal case," that
is, in some criminal judicial proceeding.88
The outcome of Chavez appears to undercut a principal assumption
underlying much of the Supreme Court's Self-Incrimination Clause
jurisprudence. Much of that jurisprudence is built on the premise that those
who invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in administrative agency
hearings, civil actions, legislative committee hearings, grand jury
proceedings, and other less formal settings have a legally enforceable right
not to have the government compel them to provide self-incriminating
disclosures that might later be used against them in a criminal prosecution.
The view of the Self-Incrimination Clause contemplated by Chavez is very
different. Under Chavez, there is no constitutional right to be free of
government compulsion to provide information. One has a constitutional
right only to avoid having any such compelled statements, or any evidence
derived therefrom, used against one in a "criminal case."
That is, the Self-Incrimination Clause can be seen as having two
distinct elements-compulsion and witnessing in a criminal case-both of
which must be fulfilled before a violation of the Clause occurs. After all,
the Clause is not offended where a criminal defendant voluntarily testifies
at trial in a criminal prosecution against him, because there is
"witness[ing]" in a "criminal case" but no compulsion. Neither is the
Clause offended when there is compulsion but no "witness[ing] in a
"criminal case," as when a person is required to answer questions before a
84 Id. at 766 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 777 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
85 Id. at 766 (plurality opinion).
86 Id. at 767 (plurality opinion).
87 Id. at 777 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
88 Accord United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2623 (2004) (plurality opinion)
("Potential violations [of the Self-Incrimination Clause] occur, if at all, only upon the
admission of [compelled incriminatory] statements into evidence at trial."); see also
Mannheimer, supra note 20, at 87-88.
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Congressional committee. But if the Clause is not violated at the time a
witness before a Congressional committee is compelled to answer, but only
much later, if and when the government seeks to use that answer in a
criminal proceeding against that person, why should federal courts be
getting involved at all at the Congressional committee stage? The Chavez
Court's attempt to answer that question unfortunately fell short of a
satisfactory explanation.
B. THE CHA VEZ EXPLANATION: EARLY ADJUDICATION OF SELF-
INCRIMINATION CLAUSE DISPUTES AS A PROPHYLACTIC
MEASURE
Both the plurality and Justice Souter attempted to explain how the
result in Chavez was consistent with the courts' historic willingness to
adjudicate Self-Incrimination Clause disputes before a criminal prosecution
is even instituted. Neither attempt, however, was very successful. Indeed,
both were largely exercises in question-begging.
Both the plurality and Justice Souter distinguished between the "core"
Fifth Amendment right not to have compelled self-incriminating testimony
used against one in a criminal proceeding, on the one hand,89 and the Court-
created "prophylactic rules,"90 or the "'extensions' of the bare guarantee," 9'
on the other. Both discussed, as an example of the latter, the Court-created
rule that a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege may be fully litigated
even before a criminal prosecution is even threatened. The plurality spoke
of the supposed "evidentiary privilege that protects witnesses from being
forced to give incriminating testimony, even in noncriminal cases, unless
that testimony has been immunized from use and derivative use in a future
criminal proceeding before it is compelled., 92 Justice Souter recounted the
various iterations of that rule, which the Court has held "bar[s] compulsion
to give testimonial evidence in a civil proceeding; requir[es] a grant of
89 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772 (2003) (plurality opinion) (describing "the core
constitutional right defined by the Self-Incrimination Clause" as "the right not to be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against oneself'); id. at 777 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (opining that Martinez's proposed "constitutional cause of
action for compensation would .. . be well outside the core of Fifth Amendment
protection").
90 Id. at 770 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e have created prophylactic rules designed to
safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause.").
" Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("'[E]xtension[s]' of the bare
guarantee may be warranted if clearly shown to be desirable means to protect the basic right
against the invasive pressures of contemporary society." (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 510 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
92 Id. at 770-71 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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immunity in advance of any testimonial proffer; [and] preclud[es] threats or
impositions of penalties that would undermine the right to immunity.
93
And both pointed to the rule first enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona94 of
"conditioning admissibility [of statements] on warnings and waivers." 95
Both the plurality and Justice Souter proceeded to justify and defend
(or at least rationalize) the existence of these rules ancillary to the core Fifth
Amendment right. The plurality defended the so-called "evidentiary
privilege" in this way: "By allowing a witness to insist on an immunity
agreement before being compelled to give incriminating testimony in a
noncriminal case, the privilege preserves the core Fifth Amendment right
from invasion by the use of that compelled testimony in a subsequent
criminal case." 96 Justice Souter agreed with this assessment, arguing that
such ancillary rules are necessary because "the core guarantee, or the
judicial capacity to protect it, would be placed at some risk in the absence
of such complementary protection."
97
But these arguments employ purely circular reasoning. Neither the
plurality nor Justice Souter ever explained how such a rule protects the
"core" Fifth Amendment right or why such a rule is essential for doing so.
Certainly, where immunity has been formally granted, the government may
not use the compelled statements or any evidence discovered as a result in a
criminal proceeding against the witness. But the Court simply assumed,
with no support, that formalized immunity is the only way to protect the
"core" Fifth Amendment rights of the witness, and that any Self-
Incrimination Clause dispute surrounding the witness's statement must be
settled "before it is compelled." 98 The Court did not consider the possibility
of an alternative mode of adjudication that permits compulsion in all
instances and requires that the parties wait to litigate any dispute until there
is a real possibility that the compelled statement or its fruits will be used in
a criminal case against its maker.
The plurality also adverted to the waiver rule99 in defending the
ancillary Fifth Amendment rule allowing litigation of Self-Incrimination
9' Id. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
94 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id at 772
(plurality opinion) ("We have... established the Miranda exclusionary rule as a
prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the text of the Self-
Incrimination Clause-the admission into evidence in criminal cases of confessions obtained
through coercive custodial questioning.").
96 Id. at 771 (plurality opinion).
97 Id. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
98 Id. at 771 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
99 See supra Part I.B. 1.
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Clause disputes prior to the time when a violation of the right is truly
threatened. It wrote:
Because the failure to assert the privilege will often forfeit the right to exclude the
evidence in a subsequent "criminal case," it is necessary to allow assertion of the
privilege prior to the commencement of a "criminal case" to safeguard the core Fifth
Amendment trial right. If the privilege could not be asserted in such situations,
testimony given in those judicial proceedings would be deemed "'voluntary"; hence,
insistence on a prior grant of immunity is essential to memorialize the fact that the
testimony had indeed been comgelled and therefore protected from use against the
speaker in any "criminal case."we
But "allow[ing] assertion of the privilege prior to the commencement
of a 'criminal case' is a far cry from allowing the resolution of a dispute
regarding claim of the constitutional privilege at that time. If a witness
asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege, but is compelled to answer
nonetheless, one would be hard-pressed to claim that her statements were
voluntarily given. Thus, the plurality was simply wrong when it asserted
that "insistence on a prior grant of immunity is essential to memorialize the
fact that the testimony had indeed been compelled." Arguably at least, a
mere claim of the constitutional privilege, regardless of whether it is
honored, should be all that is needed to "memorialize th[at] fact."
This is not to say that the historic rule allowing early adjudication of
Self-Incrimination Clause disputes necessarily lacks constitutional
foundation merely because it is termed a prophylactic rule. The Court has
created many prophylactic rules that are constitutionally based. 1 1
However, the Court's authority to create such constitutionally-based
prophylactic rules is limited. 10 2 Only when strict necessity dictates the need
for a prophylactic rule may the Court impose such a judge-made rule on the
other branches of government and the States. 10 3 While several different
10 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 771-72 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
101 See Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1030, 1037 (2001) ( "Constitutional criminal procedure is rife with prophylactic rules ....");
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 190, 190 (1988)
(.' [P]rophylactic' rules are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a
central and necessary feature of constitutional law."); see also Evan H. Caminker, Miranda
and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic" Rules, 70 U. IN. L. REV. 1, 25 (2001) (suggesting that
"there really isn't any such thing as a distinctively prophylactic rule that is in any important
way distinguishable from the more run-of-the-mill doctrine that courts routinely establish
and implement regarding every constitutional norm").
102 See generally Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A
Question ofArticle I11Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985).
103 See Klein, supra note 101, at 1068 ("Caution requires that the Court generate
prophylactic rules.., only when absolutely necessary."); Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding
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verbal formulae have been suggested to measure the necessity for such a
rule, all encompass the essential notion that the rule is illegitimate unless its
benefits in advancing constitutional norms clearly outweigh its costs. 
104
For example, the rule enunciated in Miranda, establishing an
irrebuttable presumption of compulsion in the interrogation room if certain
warnings are not issued and certain waivers obtained, 105 is prophylactic in
the sense that it protects even suspects who are completely nonplused by
custodial interrogation. Such a prophylactic rule is arguably justified only
because the courts' prior attempt to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
which suspects would not have disclosed information but for the pressure
brought to bear on them during custodial interrogation was a project fraught
with enormous inefficiencies. 106 First, because such an attempt relies on the
determination of a number of variable historical facts peculiarly within the
knowledge of the interrogator and the suspect, a court's determination of
these predicate historic facts is bound to be inaccurate in some degree.
10 7
More importantly, the ultimate issue-whether a confession was coerced or
was instead the product of free will-cannot be determined objectively but
involves a fundamentally "normative judgment about what police practices
we as a society are willing to allow., 10 8 Usually, the inefficiencies created
by such indeterminacy inure to the detriment of the criminal suspect.10 9
Miranda is justified, then, only if it produces significantly fewer "false-
negatives," i.e., instances in which a confession that was "compelled"
Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REv. 925,
926 (1999) ("Necessity is the basis for fashioning a prophylaetic rule.").
104 See Caminker, supra note 101, at 13 (proposing that the Court determine whether to
create prophylactic rule "by balancing (a) the strength of the individual's interest in avoiding
wrongful deprivation of the [constitutional right] at issue; (b) the value of additional specific
safeguards in reducing... deprivations that really should not occur under the substantive
law; and (c) the cost to legitimate government interests in providing such additional
safeguards"); Klein, supra note 101, at 1032-33 (arguing that constitutional prophylactic
rules are legitimate only where (1) remedies for actual violation of the Constitution prove
ineffective and (2) use of the prophylaxis is "more effective and involve[s] only acceptable
costs"); Landsberg, supra note 103, at 926 (arguing that prophylactic rules may be created
based only "on a balancing that takes into account not only necessity, but also federalism,
the separation of powers, and three predictive difficulties: predicting the need for the rule, its
efficacy, and its unintended consequences"); Strauss, supra note 101, at 193 (suggesting that
constitutional prophylactic rules are legitimated only by courts' need "to minimize the sum
of error costs and administrative costs" in enforcing constitutional norms).
105 See Mannheimer, supra note 20, at 71.
106 See id. at 69-70.
107 See Caminker, supra note 101, at 10.
108 Mannheimer, supra note 20, at 114; accord Caminker, supra note 101, at 10-11.
109 See Caminker, supra note 101, at 11 ("[Tlhe case-specific-voluntariness-test
produced more false-negatives than the Court could tolerate ....").
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within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment is determined to have been
freely given, "without unduly disrupting legitimate law enforcement
interests."' 10
But neither the plurality nor Justice Souter in Chavez engaged in any
similar calculus with respect to the question whether a prophylactic rule
was essential to preserve a Congressional committee witness' Self-
Incrimination Clause rights. If, as Chavez tells us, those rights are limited
to the right not to have compelled disclosures used against one in a criminal
case, then suppression of such compelled disclosures and their fruits at that
time appears to afford a completely satisfactory mechanism for securing
those rights. At the least, Justices Souter and Thomas failed to explain why
this is not the case."' Again, a constitutional rule that can be characterized
as prophylactic is not automatically illegitimate. Yet, by the same token, a
judge-made rule that results from the Court's expansion of a constitutional
norm beyond what the Court itself deems to be the limits of that norm
cannot be made legitimate merely by terming the rule "prophylactic."
In short, Chavez created a conflict with prior law by holding that a
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause arises only if and when a
person's compelled statements are used against her in a criminal
proceeding, and, at the same time, by failing to explain adequately the
Court's own precedents that appear to assume the contrary. In light of
Chavez, a true inquiry is sorely needed focusing on the ripeness of disputes
over claims of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
advance of the initiation of a criminal case.
III. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE AND CLAIMS OF THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
While Chavez teaches that the Self-Incrimination Clause is not
violated unless and until a person's compelled statements are used against
her in a criminal proceeding, much of the Court's Self-Incrimination Clause
jurisprudence has developed from cases in which no criminal prosecution
was pending, inevitable, or even anywhere in sight. While Chavez
attempted to explain this state of affairs, the explanation is unpersuasive. A
thorough review of Self-Incrimination Clause cases through the lens of the
ripeness doctrine is in order.
110 Id. at 13.
111 To be fair, their task was to decide the case before them, not to justify more than a
century of Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence.
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A. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has developed a general doctrine of ripeness,
precluding the federal courts from reaching the merits of a dispute if it
would be premature to do so. In particular, in determining whether a
federal court can properly pass on the legality of a threatened governmental
action that might arguably infringe on a person's rights, the Court has
looked to the likelihood that that governmental action will come to
fruition.' 12 Although it is only relatively recently that the Supreme Court
has articulated ripeness as a constitutionally-based doctrine, it has long held
that ripeness is an indispensable requirement for federal court involvement
in a matter."13
One commentator has identified three "interrelated, but analytically
distinct" uses of the ripeness doctrine:
First, the ripeness doctrine has perhaps most frequently been used to measure the
demands of substantive statutory or constitutional causes of action. This application
of the doctrine ... is an aspect of actionability analysis-that is, the determination of
whether the litigant has stated a claim on which relief can be granted. Second,
ripeness review often has been employed to determine whether the litigant's asserted
harm is real and concrete rather than speculative and conjectural.... Third, the
ripeness requirement has been used to serve the goals of prudent judicial decision
making... so as to ensure more accurate rulings by the courts and to allow the
challenged government action to run its course more completely. 
114
These last two concerns are especially closely related. Only where the
factual record is reasonably clear that a litigant will inevitably suffer harm
will the resulting judicial decision-making be sufficiently precise to justify
112 The ripeness doctrine also comes into play when courts are asked to determine private
rights. See, e.g., Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316 (1945). However, this article
focuses on the doctrine as applied to the adjudication of public rights.
113 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 162
(1987) ("[A]lthough the ripeness demand may have begun as an exercise in judicial
discretion, it is now firmly planted in the Constitution.") (footnote omitted).
114 Id. (footnote omitted); see also ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4
(1st ed. 1989) ("[T]he ripeness requirement... enhances judicial economy by limiting the
occasion for federal court jurisdiction and the expenditure of judicial time and revenues
[and] enhance[s] the quality ofjudicial decision-making by ensuring that there is an adequate
record to permit effective review."); C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the
Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 862, 931 (1985) ("The requirement that the
plaintiff's asserted injury be both real and immediate is justified as a means of assuring that a
question is presented with sufficient concreteness and adversity to permit informed judicial
resolution."); Varat, supra note 12, at 274 n.3 ("[T]he ripeness doctrine is partially
concerned with whether there is a sufficiently solid factual basis for deciding the substantive
issues.").
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the interference of the courts.' 15 This desire for waiting to ensure better and
more precise judicial decision-making is reinforced where the alternative is
judicial interference with the work of other governmental-not just
private-actors.1 6 Thus, the ripeness doctrine seeks to strengthen the twin
pillars of our constitutional architecture: separation of powers and
federalism. 117
The question of whether a dispute is ripe for review is governed by
two considerations: "the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration" and "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision."'"18 The
former consideration looks to "the present effects and hardships imposed by
the threat of future government action"119 and is considered to be
constitutionally based.120  The latter consideration, which is more of a
prudential constraint, 121 serves the goals of ensuring that the facts are
15 See Nichol, supra note 113, at 177 ("Litigation based upon hypothetical possibility
rather than concrete fact is apt to be poor litigation. The demand for specificity, therefore,
stems from a judicial desire for better lawmaking.").
116 See id. at 176 ("Ripeness analysis has been used.., to prevent judicial intrusions on
proper and efficient allocations of governmental powers.").
117 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.1 ("Ripeness advances separation of powers
by avoiding judicial review in situations where it is unnecessary for the federal courts to
become involved because there is not a substantial hardship to postponing review."); 13A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.1 (2d ed. 1984);
Floyd, supra note 114, at 931 ("[T]he ripeness doctrine serves separation of powers and
federalism concerns."); Marla E. Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The Supreme
Court's "Hypothetical" Barriers, 68 N.D. L. REV. 1, 22 (1992) ("Ripeness doctrine can
allow other branches of government the opportunity to work .... "); Nichol, supra note 113,
at 178 ("[T]he ripeness formula... allows the courts to postpone interfering when necessary
so that other branches of government, state and federal, may perform their functions
unimpeded."); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (discussing
the "principles of equity, comity and federalism that should inform the judgment of federal
courts when asked to oversee state law enforcement authorities"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 378 (1976) (noting that "important considerations of federalism" militate against "the
fashioning of prophylactic procedures" by a federal court "for a state agency designed to
minimize [unconstitutional] misconduct" by some of its employees).
118 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note
114, § 2.4.1; see also Nichol, supra note 113, at 161 (noting that Abbott Labs. is "still... the
'leading discussion' of the doctrine") (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Conm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983)).
119 Nichol, supra note 113, at 172-73.
120 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.1 ("The focus on whether there is a
sufficient injury without pre-enforcement review seems inextricably linked with the
constitutional requirement for cases and controversies .... "); Varat, supra note 12, at 299
("[C]ertainty of injury to the rights asserted in the suit [is] the constitutional core of
ripeness.").
121 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.1 ("[T]he focus on the quality of the record
seems prudential.").
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sufficiently developed for accurate judicial resolution while preventing
friction between the judiciary and the other organs of government. 122
The question of the hardship to the parties of waiting for court
consideration of the issue revolves around the "certainty of injury to the
rights asserted." 123  There are essentially two situations in which the
Supreme Court has consistently held that injury is sufficiently certain so
that the hardship requirement has been satisfied. 124 The first situation arises
"when an individual is faced with a choice between forgoing allegedly
unlawful behavior and risking likely prosecution with substantial
consequences."' 25 Second, sufficient hardship justifying preenforcement
judicial review has been found "where the enforcement of a statute or
regulation is certain and the only impediment to ripeness is simply a delay
before the proceedings commence. 126
122 See Nichol, supra note 113, at 161 n.54.
123 Varat, supra note 12, at 299.
124 A third possible category that has been identified is where "collateral injuries that are
not the primary focus of the lawsuit" are substantially likely to occur absent court review.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.1. This category, however, derives from a single
Supreme Court case, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59 (1978), which has been almost uniformly criticized. See infra Part III.C.
125 CHEMERNSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.2; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, §
3532.2 ("[I]t is enough to challenge a statute that the plaintiff is presently conforming to its
requirements, or must arrange its affairs to conform."); see, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1967). Hardship in this situation is increased if the "allegedly
unlawful" behavior is not only lawful, but constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.2 ("The
Supreme Court [in Steffel] found the matter ripe because denying review would impose
substantial hardship, forcing the plaintiff to choose between unnecessarily giving up possibly
protected speech or risking arrest and criminal punishment."); Nichol, supra note 113, at 166
("Rather than force citizens to curtail the exercise of their asserted [F]irst [A]mendment
rights in order to avoid prosecution, courts have permitted facial challenges to regulations of
expression even before the institution of other legal proceedings."). Admittedly, "some
Supreme Court cases deviate from this principle." Id. at 103-04 (discussing Int'l
Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954) and United Pub. Workers of Am. v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)). Chemerinsky describes these decisions as "unjust and
inconsistent with" the bulk of precedent. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.2. See
also Mansfield, supra note 117, at 20-21 (characterizing Boyd as "egregious"); WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 117, § 3532.4, at 170-71 (noting that both Boyd and Mitchell were
"insensitive to the hardship of denying decision," have been heavily criticized, and were
"seriously undermined" by Clemens v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982)). In addition, Mitchell
appears to have been overruled sub silentio by United States Civil Service Commission v.
National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). See CHEMERNSKY, supra
note 114, § 2.4.2; see also Floyd, supra note 114, at 932 (noting that "the Court has
recognized the unjustified hardships caused by" decisions such as Boyd and Mitchell).
126 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114; accord Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12, 116-17
(1976); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 508 (1972); see Reg'l Rail Reorg.
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) ("Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute
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The second consideration127 courts use to determine whether an issue
is ripe for review is the fitness of the issue for judicial resolution. Because
in the context of preenforcement review a factual record is unlikely to have
developed, the question of fitness generally turns on whether the issue is a
purely legal one or, rather, is highly fact-intensive:
The more a question is purely a legal issue the analysis of which does not depend on a
particular factual context, the more likely it is that the Court will find ripeness. But the
more judicial consideration of an issue would be enhanced by a specific set of facts,
the greater the probability that a case seeking preenforcement review will be
dismissed on ripeness grounds.
128
B. TAKING RIPENESS SERIOUSLY: 129 APPLYING RIPENESS PRINCIPLES
TO DISPUTES OVER THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In order to analyze how the ripeness doctrine would apply in cases
where there is a dispute over a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, let us first consider the legislative or
administrative hearing as the paradigmatic context where such a dispute
might arise. This has been chosen as the paradigm because the legislative
or administrative hearing is a forum where a person can be legally
against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable
controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into
effect."); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.2 ("[T]he Court has found substantial
hardship... where the enforcement of a statute or regulation is certain and the only
impediment to ripeness is simply a delay before the proceedings commence."); cf Ashcroft
v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 n.2 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that suit, brought by father of
teen killed by police as he attempted to escape arrest, to declare Missouri statute authorizing
such actions unconstitutional was unripe, although plaintiff had second son who might also
be killed if police attempted to arrest him, because "[s]uch speculation is insufficient to
establish the existence of a present, live controversy"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373
(1976) (rejecting intervention by federal court to prevent future misconduct by city officials
based on twenty incidents having occurred "in a city of three million inhabitants, with 7,500
policemen"); Floyd, supra note 114, at 932-33 (justifying finding that such cases were
unripe because "there was considerable uncertainty whether the plaintiffs would again
engage in a course of conduct that would expose them to the allegedly unconstitutional
statute or practice, and, if so, whether the statute or practice would be applied to them").
127 It appears that both hardship and fitness must be sufficiently shown to demonstrate
that an issue is ripe for review. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.3. It is unclear
whether and to what extent a deficiency of one will be excused because the other is
particularly compelling. See id.
128 Id; accord Mansfield, supra note 117, at 69 ("Issue appraisal in the ripeness
context ... often centers on whether the question is one of law."); see, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200-01, 203 (1983).
129 With apologies to RONALD DwOmuN, TAING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
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compelled to testify and even incriminate herself, without the further
complication present when considering the grand jury.' 30
1. The Basics: No Dispute Over the Claim of the Constitutional Privilege
Before looking at how ripeness principles would apply to a dispute
over a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege, it will be necessary to
review the procedure currently followed when there is no dispute, that is,
where a witness makes a concededly valid claim of that privilege. Suppose
a witness before a Congressional committee is asked a question that she
believes calls for an incriminatory response and she raises a claim of the
constitutional privilege. If the committee agrees, it has two options: move
on to another line of questioning that does not call for self-incriminatory
responses or grant the witness immunity-the scope of which both parties
agree upon-and direct her to answer. It will choose the former if, on
balance, the benefit of receiving the information does not outweigh the
costs associated with its inability to use any information uncovered against
the witness in a subsequent prosecution. It will choose the latter if the
opposite is true.
131
2. Two Models for Resolving a Dispute Over the Claim of the
Constitutional Privilege .
Suppose now that the witness and the committee disagree over
whether she has validly claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege. The
witness is directed to answer and she persists with her claim of the
constitutional privilege. Two possible models exist to resolve this dispute.
Pursuant to an "early adjudication model," which is the model used under
current law, the Self-Incrimination Clause dispute may, and ordinarily
must, be resolved at the time the conflict arises. Pursuant to a "postponed
adjudication model," the parties wait to resolve the dispute until criminal
proceedings are initiated against the witness, if that ever occurs.
130 See infra Part III.F.
131 This analysis concededly oversimplifies the extent to which the Congressional
committee members in our example, located within the legislative branch of government,
share a community of interest with the eventual prosecuting authorities, the Attorney
General and the particular United States Attorney in whose jurisdiction the eventual criminal
case would happen to fall, who serve under the President in the executive branch. Lack of
cooperation and communication and, indeed, downright antagonism, in this context between
these two loci of power is certainly a possibility. However, these problems would exist
irrespective of whether the position proposed by this article is adopted.
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a. The Early Adjudication Model
Pursuant to the early adjudication model, the committee will bring a
contempt proceeding against the witness in court. It is at this point that the
Self-Incrimination Clause dispute will be resolved-either her claim of the
constitutional privilege will be held valid and her refusal to answer will be
upheld, or her Fifth Amendment claim will be held invalid and she will be
held in contempt.132 If the former occurs, the committee may, again, grant
her immunity if on balance it feels her information is worth the price. If
not, the committee will not obtain the information it seeks.
If the witness is held in contempt, she might purge herself of the
contempt by answering the question but she does so at the risk of forever
waiving her claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege. It is true that in some
decisions the Supreme Court has implied that once an objection is made, it
is preserved for all time. If the witness then answers the question after
having objected, she may raise the issue at a later date if a prosecutor seeks
to admit her answers against her in a criminal proceeding.' 33 However,
such a procedural mechanism for protecting Fifth Amendment rights has
not been recognized as inherent in the Fifth Amendment itself.134 Instead,
such mechanisms have been permitted to develop as a matter of sub-
constitutional rules that may prescribe one type of response over another to
a question that calls for a self-incriminating answer.135  Although "[t]he
privilege protects persons from being compelled to become witnesses
against themselves, [it] is silent concerning the procedure by which they
132 See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 467 (1975) ("The witness, once advised of the
right, can choose for himself whether to risk contempt in order to test the privilege before
evidence is produced.").
133 See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976) ("[U]nless immunity is
conferred... testimony may be suppressed, along with its fruits, if it is compelled over an
appropriate claim of privilege."); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 256 (1966)
(reinstating indictment but remanding for opportunity for defendant to move to suppress
previously compelled disclosures); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment protects a witness "from the use of self-incriminating testimony he
is compelled to give over his objection").
134 See Maness, 419 U.S. at 470 ("[W]ith no state statute or rule guaranteeing a privilege
or assuring that at a later criminal prosecution the compelled magazines would be
inadmissible, it appears that there was no avenue other than assertion of the privilege, with
the risk of contempt, that would have provided assurance of appellate review in advance of
surrendering the magazines.").
135 See id. at 468 ("[T]his is not a case where state law is clear that a response to
compulsory process under protest renders the response inadmissible in any criminal
prosecution against the witness ...."); see also id. at 463 ("Here the 'eat' was not yet 'out of
the bag' and reliance upon a later objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with
no assurance whatever of putting it back.").
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should object to such compulsion.' 36 As Westen and Mandell explained,
under current law:
The Constitution... states no preference for a witness's response to such choices.
The privilege against self-incrimination does not prescribe silence as the sole
permissible response. Nor does it create a right to remain silent as opposed to a right
to avoid compulsory self-incrimination in other ways. Rather, it offers the witness the
right to avoid the evils of compulsory self-incrimination by guaranteeing at least one
constitutionally acceptable response to his [F]ifth [A]mendment predicament.
137
The procedure that must be used when the witness is faced with the
requirement that she incriminate herself is, oddly enough, that preferred by
the very government putting her to the choice.
1 38
It appears to be "the traditional rule" that those who want to attack
"rulings rejecting testimonial privileges [must] stand on their claims of
privilege and face contempt, rather than testify.' 39 And the government
may well express a preference that the Congressional committee witness
continue to assert the privilege rather than disclose information and later
move for suppression of the compelled statement.1 40 This is because where
136 Peter Westen & Stewart Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging Fifth
Amendment Doctrine of the "Preferred Response, " 19 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 521, 524 (1982).
137 Id. at 533-34 (footnote omitted).
138 Accord id. at 534 ("Any preference that may exist for silence, or for any other specific
response, derives from state law."); see id. at 523 ("An individual is constitutionally entitled
to be free from state compulsion to incriminate himself The state, however, has legitimate
interests in requiring individuals to assert constitutional claims-including claims under the
privilege of self-incrimination-by procedures that minimize the resulting burdens on the
state.").
139 Id. at 542; see also Gary A. Schlessinger, Comment, Testimonial Waiver of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Brown v. United States, 48 CAL. L. REv. 123, 127
n.23 (1960) ("[W]hen a federal court incorrectly orders a witness to testify, the witness must
either risk jail or abandon the privilege."); Westen & Mandell, supra note 136, at 543
("Traditionally, a witness who wishes to appeal a trial judge's decision to overrule a
testimonial privilege must be willing to stand in contempt to do so.").
140 See Westen & Mandell, supra note 136, at 532 ("The state has ... a strong and
legitimate interest in preferring that a witness faced with [Fifth [A]mendment compulsion
respond by remaining silent, rather than by making a tainted statement."); see also Garner v.
United States, 424 U.S. 648, 665 n.21 (1976) (holding that taxpayer must remain silent on
tax returns rather than disclose incriminating information because "[a]ny other rule would
deprive the Government of its choice between compelling the evidence from the claimant in
exchange for immunity and avoiding the burdens of immunization by obtaining the evidence
elsewhere"). Westen & Mandell, supra note 136, at 534-35, argue that the Court in United
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970), "implicitly held" that the U.S. has a "common law
preference for silence as a method for asserting [F]ifth [A]mendment claims," at least in the
context presented there.
A third option, of course, is that the Congressional committee witness can lie.
However, the Court has expressly held that perjury is never preferable to either of the other
two options. See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178 (1977) ("[E]ven the predicament
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a statement is compelled, not only the statement itself but all other evidence
derived therefrom is suppressible. 141 Moreover, upon a motion to suppress,
the government has the burden of proving that its evidence did not derive
from the compelled statement. 142 And the broadest application of this rule
would prohibit even non-evidentiary uses of evidence derived from the
compelled statement, such as the formation of litigation strategies.1 43 The
strain of proving that compelled statements did not taint other evidence or
lead to non-evidentiary uses has been known to sabotage more than one
prosecution. 144
Thus, the government might well prefer the rule that the Congressional
committee witness must remain silent in order to preserve her claim of the
constitutional privilege. On the other hand, no statute or common-law rule
under current law-at least at the federal level--"explicitly spell[s] out the
proper way to raise [F]ifth [A]mendment claims."'145 Consequently, our
paradigmatic witness before a Congressional committee who is ordered to
answer a question over a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege, is left
with a dilemma: refuse to answer and face contempt; or answer the question
on the off-chance that some future court will not deem that response to have
been the dis-preferred one. As the second Justice Harlan described it: "[A]
witness may sometimes have to walk a tightrope between waiver of his
privilege, if he answers a question later held to be incriminatory, and
contempt, if he refuses to answer a question later held to be
nonincriminatory.'
146
of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood, as opposed to refusing
to answer, does not justify perjury."); see also Westen & Mandell, supra note 136, at 549
("A witness is not entitled to lie because of a reasonable fear that she will otherwise be
subjected to contempt or self-incrimination .... ").
141 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Westen & Mandell, supra note
136, at 531.
142 See Westen & Mandell, supra note 136, at 531.
143 See generally Gary S. Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond
the Fifth Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 351 (1987).
144 The most notable examples were the prosecutions of Oliver North and John
Poindexter in relation to the so-called "Iran-Contra" affair of the mid-1980s. See United
States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940
(D.C. Cir. 1991); R.S. Ghio, Note, The Iran-Contra Prosecutions and the Failure of Use
Immunity, 45 STAN. L. REv. 229, 243-51 (1992); see also Amar & Lettow, supra note 78, at
878-79 (arguing that the "staggering" burden put on the prosecution in Poindexter and North
to prove that their cases were entirely uninfluenced by the defendants' prior immunized
testimony essentially transformed the immunity bestowed into transactional immunity).
145 Westen & Mandell, supra note 136, at 533.
146 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 212 (1955) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Black similarly described
this dilemma for witnesses: On the one hand, they risk imprisonment for contempt by asserting
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Moreover, the decision whether or not to claim the constitutional
privilege must be made on the spot with little time for reflection or
deliberation. 147 It must also be made, at least sometimes, without counsel,
for there is no general constitutional right to an attorney in a grand jury
proceeding, a legislative or administrative hearing, a civil case, or a less
formalized adversary setting. 48 For an indigent person, this means that
consultation with counsel is a virtual impossibility. And even if she can
afford an attorney, there is no constitutional requirement that she be allowed
to consult with counsel before making this weighty decision.,
49
b. The Postponed Adjudication Model
One can imagine an alternative system allowing, or even requiring,
postponement of the resolution of the Self-Incrimination Clause dispute.
As under current law, such a system would require the Congressional
committee witness to memorialize her objection to the question. However,
unlike current law, she would also be required to provide the information if
she is pressed for an answer by the committee, even without a formal grant
the privilege prematurely; on the other, they might lose the privilege if they answer a single
question. The Court's view makes the protection depend on timing so refined that lawyers, let
alone laymen, will have difficulty in knowing when to claim it.
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Maness v.
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 463 (1975) ("[N]oncompliance risk[s] both an immediate contempt
citation and a final criminal contempt judgment against the witness if, on appeal, [his
attorney's] advice [to plead the privilege] prove[s] to be wrong."); Westen & Mandell, supra
note 136, at 547 n.95 ("[T]he privilege against self-incrimination may not provide breathing
room for witnesses who are reasonably uncertain as to whether they possess a valid claim of
privilege.").
147 Westen & Mandell, supra note 136, at 537, argue that "[t]he state may not demand a
preferred response of silence from a witness who has no opportunity to reflect on his choice
of responses." However, they intuit this rule from a single Supreme Court decision that
supports such a rule, at best, only by implication. See id. at 537-38 (discussing Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)). Similarly, they argue that "[t]he state cannot insist on
silence if the state is responsible for a witness's uncertainty whether silence is preferred."
Id. at 539. Again, they cite only a single Supreme Court decision for this supposed rule, see
id. (discussing United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969)), and, again, that decision does not
directly support the proposition that such a rule currently exists. However persuasive is
Westen and Mandell's intuition that such a witness ought to be able to take the "answer now,
litigate later" approach in these circumstances (and, indeed, as I argue, must take that
approach), it is far from clear that current law gives that witness the option.
141 See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) ("A witness before a
grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by his
counsel.") (quotations omitted); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981)
(rejecting general constitutional right to counsel in civil cases).
149 See, e.g., Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 581 ("[Tlhe witness may not insist upon the
presence of his attorney in the grand jury room.").
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of immunity. Only after she has answered and the prosecuting authorities
have instituted criminal proceedings against her in which they wish to use
this answer, or any derivative evidence, could the Self-Incrimination Clause
dispute be resolved via a motion to suppress. We can call this the
"postponed adjudication model."
Note that pursuant to the postponed adjudication model, the ability to
"answer now, litigate later" would not depend on the vagaries of any sub-
constitutional rule. The Self-Incrimination Clause itself would permit the
witness to litigate the issue even if she has acquiesced to the order to
answer the question. So long as she has memorialized her claim of the Fifth
Amendment privilege by making it before being directed to answer, she
cannot be deemed to have waived that privilege by answering.
This is, in essence, the position advocated by Justice White in his
separate opinion in Maness v. Meyers. He believed that the Fifth
Amendment itself renders testimony suppressible when given over a claim
of privilege, even in the absence of a sub-constitutional rule to that effect.
He wrote:
[W]hat of the case.., where the claim of privilege is overruled... ? It seems to me
that in such event the witness is nevertheless protected by a constitutionally imposed
use immunity if he answers in response to the order and under threat of contempt. If,
contrary to the expectations of the judge but consistent with the claim of the witness
and his lawyer, the State later finds the answer or its fruits incriminating and offers
either against the witness in a criminal prosecution, the witness has a valid objection
to the evidence on the ground that he was coerced by a court order to reveal it and that
it is therefore compelled self-incrimination barred from use by the Fifth
Amendment. 
150
As under current law, a claim of the constitutional privilege is necessary to
preserve the issue; unlike current law, however, the objection is also
sufficient.
3. Ripeness of Self-Incrimination Clause Disputes Arising in the
Legislative or Administrative Hearing
Keeping in mind at least the hypothetical availability of the postponed
adjudication model, let us consider how traditional ripeness principles
would apply to a dispute over the application of the Self-Incrimination
Clause in the legislative or administrative hearing context. 1 ' To do so, it
150 Maness, 419 U.S. at 474 (White, J., concurring in the result); see also Garrity, 385
U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting); Westen & Mandell, supra note 136, at 540-41 (discussing
Justice White's view).
151 If there is no dispute-that is, if all parties agree that the witness has properly
objected to the government's use of compulsion to wrench self-incriminating information
from her-the result under either model is the same. Under the early adjudication model, the
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will be necessary to look back at some of the different types of disputes that
can arise: over whether the question calls for an incriminatory response;
over whether the witness has properly made her claim of the Fifth
Amendment privilege; over whether the government has used compulsion;
and over the scope of immunity.152 For each type of dispute, we will apply
to our paradigm case the two considerations that determine whether any
issue is ripe for review: the hardship to the witness of waiting for judicial
review of the order to answer and the fitness of the issue for judicial review.
Such an analysis demonstrates two things. First, in the wake of Chavez,
there can be no credible claim of hardship to the witness resulting from a
requirement that she wait until the institution of criminal proceedings
against her before any Self-Incrimination Clause dispute is resolved.
Second, even before Chavez, it was clear that most types of Self-
Incrimination Clause disputes in the pre-prosecution mode are particularly
unfit for judicial review.
a. Disputes Over Whether an Incriminatory Response was Called For
First, let us consider the case where the parties disagree over whether
the question calls for an incriminatory response on the part of the witness.
i. Hardship to the Witness
What is the hardship to the witness of requiring that she answer a
question to which she has a Fifth Amendment objection? That is, in the
pre-prosecution mode, is there threatened or actual injury to the witness
falling into either of the two categories' 53 sufficient to make the issue ripe?
government will grant the witness immunity and she will be required to answer but her
answer and its fruits cannot be used against her in a later prosecution. See supra text
accompanying notes 29-30. Under the postponed adjudication model, the government will
order the witness to answer over her objection and she will be required to answer but her
answer and its fruits cannot be used against her in a later prosecution. See O'Neill, supra
note 28, at 2473 (suggesting that "Congress can compel incriminating statements from a
witness [but] the statements would not be admissible in that witness's future criminal trial");
id. at 2547 (similar). Thus, the only difference is whether immunity is formally granted. See
id. at 2551 (equating a congressional decision to grant immunity with its decision "to ignore
the Fifth Amendment privilege altogether"). Under the postponed adjudication model,
formal grants of immunity would be recognized for what they are-formal-and would
become superfluous.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 34-43. This list is meant not to be exhaustive but
rather to aid in understanding how a traditional ripeness analysis can apply to various types
of disputes. These categories do cover many of the disputes that have reached the Supreme
Court.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
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First, there is no actual injury yet because the witness has not been put
to the choice of foregoing arguably legally-protected behavior or violating
the law. To understand why, we must turn again to Chavez. Chavez
teaches that the witness' rights pursuant to the Self-Incrimination Clause
extend no further than the right to have compelled statements excluded
from evidence in any criminal proceedings against her. They do not include
the various prophylactic mechanisms the courts have set in place in order to
protect the core right. Thus, just as a suspect in police custody has no
constitutional right to have warnings read to him and a waiver obtained
pursuant to Miranda before giving an incriminating statement, 54 neither
does our Congressional committee witness have a constitutional right to
refuse to answer a question propounded to her. She has only the right not to
have that answer or its fruits used against her in a later prosecution. She
thus suffers no hardship with respect to that right when she is required to
answer a question even over a valid claim of the constitutional privilege, as
long as she is able to litigate the admissibility of the information provided
and its fruits at the appropriate time-when the government seeks to use
them against her.
Second, the injury is not inevitable. Prosecutors have extraordinarily
wide discretion in deciding whether to bring criminal charges. 55 Thus, it
can hardly be said that a criminal prosecution is inevitable. Moreover, the
injury would occur, not from the mere institution of charges, but from the
use of the compelled testimony or its fruits against the witness-turned-
defendant. Until the prosecutor manifests an intent to use such evidence
against the former witness, there is no inevitability of injury.
In fact, where the dispute is over whether the question calls for an
incriminatory response, the postponed adjudication model effectively
forecloses the government's use of the response in a later criminal
proceeding against the witness altogether. After all, if the government later
seeks to use the response against the witness, it is, by definition,
incriminatory as to her, since, according to the government at least, it
supplies a link in the chain of evidence proving her guilt. Of course, the
parties will still need to litigate just prior to trial the admissibility of any
evidence arguably derived from the response. However, this is true even
where formal immunity is granted under the early adjudication model.
Thus, the postponed adjudication model not only imposes no hardship to
154 See Mannheimer, supra note 20, at 122-24.
155 See Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 n.29 (1974) ("Because the
decision to instigate a criminal prosecution is usually discretionary with the prosecuting
authorities, even a person with a settled intention to disobey the law can never be sure that
the sanctions of the law will be invoked against him.").
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the witness's Self-Incrimination Clause rights, it virtually eliminates the
need to litigate the issue of the incriminating nature of the response: any
response and its fruits that the government wants to use against the witness
in a criminal prosecution must be excluded.
The same result obtains even if, as some have argued, 56 the
government should be able to admit into evidence anything derived from
the compelled statement. Under this theory, the Self-Incrimination Clause
does not prohibit the admission of physical evidence derived even from a
compelled statement. 157 Accordingly, the witness has no right pursuant to
the Self-Incrimination Clause to keep from the Congressional committee
information that might lead to other evidence against her. She has only the
right pursuant to that Clause to keep her own compelled statements
themselves from being used against her. Again, allowing her to move to
suppress those statements prior to trial affords her an adequate remedy to
secure that right. And since such statements are, by definition,
incriminatory, she can be assured of winning that motion every time.
Thus, according to neither accepted theory of hardship has this prong
of the ripeness requirement been satisfied. The witness suffers no current
injury to her Self-Incrimination Clause rights because the Constitution
affords her no right to avoid disclosing self-incriminatory information and
she is not "chilled" from exercising any rights she does have; and the
violation of her rights is not inevitable, for it is contingent on the
government's instituting a prosecution against her, which is by no means
certain.
One might ask why, if there is no hardship to the witness of waiting for
resolution of a meritorious claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
156 See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 78, at 858-59, 911; Mannheimer, supra note 20,
at 125.
157 A plurality of the Supreme Court recently wrote that "[t]he Self-Incrimination
Clause... is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a
voluntary statement." United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (emphasis added). Yet, in Patane, the issue was the admissibility of physical
evidence discovered as a result of questioning not preceded by the warnings and waiver
prescribed by Miranda. See id at 2624. A statement resulting from such questioning can by
no means be deemed "voluntary," since the rule enunciated in Miranda conclusively
presumes, to the contrary, that such a statement is compelled. See Mannheimer, supra note
20, at 71 ("The Miranda rule... establishes a conclusive presumption that, without the
appropriate warnings and waiver, any response by a suspect to custodial interrogation has
been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause .... "). The Patane
plurality's conclusion that such a statement is "voluntary" so that physical evidence derived
from it need not be excluded paid inadequate attention to the very foundation of Miranda
and appears to be an artifice allowing the Court to avoid confronting the real issue: whether
physical evidence derived even from a compelled statement need be suppressed.
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self-incrimination, have witnesses typically not chosen to follow this route,
even if they are not required to. Why, that is, would a witness ever choose
to stand on the privilege and risk contempt rather than take the postponed
adjudication model's approach, confident that statements following a valid
claim of the constitutional privilege, and their sequelae, are inadmissible in
evidence against the witness in a criminal prosecution? There are
essentially three reasons. First, most if not all witnesses will consider
factors in addition to possible criminal liability, such as loss of employment
and damage to reputation, when deciding to risk contempt rather than
provide self-incriminating responses. 58  Second, witnesses, and their
attorneys, have become inured to a system in which the Supreme Court has
repeatedly announced in dicta-incorrectly, as Chavez informs us-that the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects witnesses from
divulging information that might later be used against them in a criminal
case. Most importantly, however, under current law, the witness has no
assurance that she can take the "talk now, litigate later" approach. Indeed,
most signs point to the contrary. 15 9
Thus, considerations beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination
Clause have created a system in which the early adjudication model is the
norm. Yet, ironically, not only does the postponed adjudication model
cause no hardship to the witness, at least with respect to her rights pursuant
to the Self-Incrimination Clause properly understood, but it seems also that
it is the early adjudication model that most strains the witness's Self-
Incrimination Clause rights. 60
ii. Fitness for Judicial Review
The other consideration that must be examined to determine whether
this Self-Incrimination Clause dispute is ripe in the pre-prosecution mode is
the fitness of the issue for judicial review. While the hardship analysis rests
in large part upon the renewed understanding wrought by Chavez of the
rights actually protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause, the lack of
fitness of Self-Incrimination Clause disputes for judicial review in the pre-
prosecution mode has been manifest for some time.
Under the early adjudication model, at the point the contempt court
must determine whether our Congressional committee witness's claim of
the constitutional privilege is valid, it has virtually no information at its
158 See O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2515 (noting that during House Un-American
Activities Committee hearings in the early 1950s, witnesses' "reputations, livelihoods, and
even families hung on the answers given").
159 See supra text accompanying notes 134-40.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 134-49.
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disposal. It has general information regarding the purpose of the hearing, it
knows the questions asked of the witness, and it might have the answers to
any questions that the witness deemed unobjectionable (though, as
discussed below, this might simply create additional problems). It may be
that only the witness herself will know why the answer to a seemingly
innocuous question might be incriminating, and yet it is ultimately the
contempt court that must decide whether her fear of disclosing self-
inculpatory information is reasonable.16 ' The court must decide the fate of
the witness while sealed in a virtual juridical vacuum.
Of course, it is possible to institute procedures to address these
concerns, such as by having the witness explain herself to the judge ex parte
and in camera. While such procedures might ameliorate the lack of fitness
of the issue for judicial review, they are not a panacea. In the early stages
of an investigation, the judge may not fully comprehend how the response
sought could possibly furnish a link in the chain of evidence connecting the
witness to a crime. Even with the aid of counsel, the witness may not
herself fully comprehend this either, and may not be able explain this to the
judge except in the most vague and conclusory way.
The result of all this may well be that courts will err on the side of
upholding the witness's claim of the constitutional privilege.162 Yet while
defense attorneys may cheer this result, fans of an accurate and impartial
accommodation between the genuine rights of witnesses pursuant to the
Fifth Amendment and the truth-seeking function of investigative bodies
should hope for more.
This strain on the courts' resources caused by their having to decide
such weighty matters on such a paltry factual record is almost wholly
unnecessary. Under a postponed adjudication model, the issue of whether a
given response is incriminatory would virtually never have to be litigated.
This is because, again, if the prosecution were to seek to admit evidence of
the response against the witness-turned-defendant in a criminal proceeding,
then that response was, by definition, incriminating. The postponed
adjudication model in this instance is a misnomer because it does not
merely postpone adjudication of the Self-Incrimination Clause dispute-it
eliminates the necessity of that adjudication. By requiring the witness to
answer the question when she is ordered to do so, this model automatically
confers immunity on the witness when she gives an answer that is
responsive to the question. There is nothing left to litigate. When it comes
161 See supra Part I.B.3.
162 See Note, supra note 49, at 1768 ("If there is a discernible trend in testimonial waiver
cases, it is toward greater deference to exercises of the [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege .... ").
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to considerations of fitness for review, then, the postponed adjudication
model wins hands down.
b. Disputes Over Whether the Constitutional Privilege was Waived
Next, we must consider another major area of dispute: where the
parties disagree over whether the privilege was waived.
i. Hardship to the Witness
The witness suffers minimal hardship by being required to wait to
resolve such a dispute because, for the same reasons already discussed, she
has not suffered constitutional injury and no such injury is inevitable.
Again, this is not to say that she suffers no injury. If she is unsure whether
her position is correct, she will have to choose between standing in
contempt or divulging information that can later be used against her if her
position turns out to be incorrect. But, again, the Self-Incrimination Clause,
properly understood, does not provide her the right to refuse to divulge the
information. So it does no constitutional harm to her to require her to
choose between obeying and disobeying the law.
163
ii. Fitness for Judicial Review
In addition, for all the reasons stated previously with regard to disputes
over whether the question calls for an incriminatory response, a dispute
over whether the witness has waived the Fifth Amendment privilege is
generally unfit for judicial review. If the dispute is simply over whether the
witness has put the objection in the proper form, of course, the record is
likely sufficient because the dispute is easily resolvable; the court need
merely look at whether the witness actually invoked the Fifth Amendment.
However, for the same reason, such disputes will rarely occur. More likely,
the dispute will revolve around whether the witness has waived the
objection by raising it too late. 164
Such cases occur where the witness was not fully appreciative of the
incriminating nature of a line of questioning at the outset and instead
became aware of the danger of self-incrimination only after a more
obviously incriminating query had been posed. The question for the
163 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) (noting that "the Constitution
does not.., always forbid requiring [a person] to" make difficult choices).
164 There is a nice symmetry here: the dispute here is essentially whether the objection
came too late, whereas the dispute over whether a question calls for an incriminatory
response is often a question of whether the objection has been raised too early.
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contempt court then becomes whether the witness has crossed the Rogers
165
Rubicon-that is, whether her answers to the first few questions operated as
a waiver of an objection to all others in the same line of questioning.!
66
Matters become more complicated, and the record even less fit for judicial
review, under these circumstances. The court must determine, not simply
whether the answer would be incriminating, a task hard enough in itself, but
whether the answer would be further incriminating in light of the answers
already given.167 That is, the question becomes not whether the answer
could be incriminating but whether it would be marginally incriminating
given the already incriminating testimony. Again, this determination is
made by a court that is almost wholly "in the dark" as to the eventual, and
hypothetical, case against the witness.168 Thus, not only must the court
"determine whether an answer will be... 'further incriminating' before the
judge knows exactly what the answer will be"'16 9-the same problem
presented when the court must merely determine whether an answer will be
incriminating-but the court has the further, seemingly impossible task of
determining whether an answer would be further incriminating "without
knowing what other evidence there is or eventually might be against the
,,170
witness.
Contrast this paltry state of the record with the one that will exist just
prior to trial. The prosecution will know, and will be able to present to the
court upon a motion to suppress, what evidence it intends to produce
against the witness-turned-defendant. With the aid of defense counsel, the
court will be able to determine from the evidence as it has developed, rather
than guess about how the evidence will develop, whether the witness was
justified in objecting when she did. The contrast between an abstract,
hypothetical dispute and a concrete, real one could not be more stark.
165 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951); see supra text accompanying
notes 48-50.
166 See Note, supra note 49, at 1759 ("A witness without immunity faces the dilemma of
refusing to answer, possibly risking contempt, and invoking the privilege too late, only to
discover that its protections have been waived."); see also id. at 1754 ("[lIt [is] difficult for a
witness to determine whether answering one question will operate as a waiver of the
privilege to refuse to answer further inquiries.").
167 See id. at 1755 ("[F]ederal courts have adhered... to a 'further incrimination'
approach to testimonial waiver, focusing the inquiry on whether the information sought
could further incriminate the witness .. ").
168 See id. at 1758 ("[T]he judge must essentially determine, without knowing what the
bulk of the evidence in the case could eventually consist of, that the absence of the [further
incriminating] information sought would not cause a reasonable doubt to exist in the minds
ofjurors.").
169 Id. at 1759.
170 Id.
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Again, the lack of fitness of judicial review of this type of dispute in the
pre-prosecution mode is clear, especially when compared to the superiority
of proceeding, pursuant to the postponed adjudication model, via a motion
to suppress just prior to trial, if there is to be one.171
c. Disputes Over Whether the Government Employed Compulsion
When we consider disputes over whether the government has utilized
compulsion, we must change our hypothetical case, for it is well accepted
that the threat of contempt acts as compulsion within the meaning of the
Self-Incrimination Clause. Positing a civil case gives the same result, since
there, too, the presiding judge has the power to hold a litigant in contempt if
she fails to comply with discovery demands. Suppose, instead, that a
Congressional committee witness, a federal employee, is told that she must
waive immunity before the committee-effectively waiving the privilege
prospectively as to all questions-or she will lose her job. If the witness
disputes that the committee has the right to do this, she might, pursuant to
the early adjudication model, refuse to sign the waiver, lose her job, and
then bring a civil action to get her job back, the separate civil action now
being the functional equivalent of the contempt proceeding in the earlier
hypotheticals. 172 Pursuant to the postponed adjudication model, she would
be required to waive immunity, answer all questions, and, if she is ever
prosecuted, move to suppress the information she provided and its fruits on
the ground that her testimony was compelled by the government's threat
that a refusal to waive immunity would result in her loss of employment. In
either event, the question is the same: whether the government's threat
constituted compulsion within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination
Clause.
171 The overwhelming majority of criminal indictments result in guilty pleas. See
JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMrNAL LAW 8 (3d ed. 2003) ("[T]he
conviction rate obtained by guilty pleas typically nears or exceeds ninety percent."). At least
some of these take place before motions to suppress are litigated. Once again, the
"postponed" adjudication model becomes, in many cases, a non-adjudication model, saving
scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources and giving us all the more reason to prefer this to
the early adjudication model.
172 See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 512-13 (1967) ("judicial inquiry" witness
required to, waive immunity on pain of being barred from practicing his profession); see also
Leflcowitz 'v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805-06 (1977) (grand jury witness required to
waive immunity on pain of being barred from public office); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S.
70, 84-85 (1973) (grand jury witness required to waive immunity on pain of being barred
from entering into contracts with State).
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i. Hardship to the Witness
What is the hardship to the witness of waiting to adjudicate this Self-
Incrimination Clause dispute? As in the earlier hypotheticals, there is none
because the injury to her Self-Incrimination Clause rights has not yet
occurred and is not inevitable. Again, pursuant to Chavez, a person has no
right not to be compelled to incriminate herself; she has only the right not to
have such statements used against her in a criminal proceeding. Thus,
when she is faced with what she considers compulsion to incriminate
herself, even if she is correct, her rights have not yet been violated. The
harm thus does not fall into the first category of the hardship analysis. Nor
does it fall into the second category: the harm is not inevitable because the
government may or may not ultimately bring criminal charges against the
witness. Where prosecutorial discretion is interposed between
compulsion-even assuming it is compulsion-and the use of the
statements "in [a] criminal case," the injury becomes speculative rather than
certain.
Note, however, in this unique instance, the potential harshness of the
postponed adjudication model. At the time the questions are propounded,
the witness must make a decision whether to acquiesce in the waiver of
immunity and keep her job or, alternatively, sacrifice her job in order to
avoid providing information that might later be used against her, an option a
rational witness might well choose. Of course, the information could be
used against her only if a court would later hold that no compulsion has
occurred, but at the time she makes her decision, the witness does not know
what a court would do. The witness might gamble that a later court would
hold the government's threat to constitute compulsion, and answer the
questions to keep her job, only to find out later when she is prosecuted that
she was not "compelled" at all, and her answers and their fruit can be used
against her. Under the early adjudication model, the witness takes a chance
also, by refusing to answer the questions, losing her job, and suing to get it
back. But the price of being wrong in that instance, the loss of her job, is
probably far lower than the price tag attached to being wrong under the
postponed adjudication model-criminal liability and possible
imprisonment.
The harshness of this result, however, would not flow from a
principled application of the ripeness doctrine in Self-Incrimination Clause
cases. It is, rather, a result of the notion, unfortunately reinforced by some
of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area, that information can be
disclosed over the objection of the invoker and still not be "compelled."
Thus, while the Supreme Court has held that it constitutes compulsion to
require a witness before an administrative agency or grand jury to provide
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information on pain of being barred from pursuing her livelihood, as in our
example, 173 it has been less solicitous of those in less formalized settings,
especially prison inmates, where the government either offers to bestow a
benefit or threatens to exact a price in order to obtain self-incriminating
information. 7 4 It is at least arguable that compulsion should be recognized
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment whenever a person has claimed the
privilege after the government has made such an offer or a threat. 175 It
stands to reason that even if compulsion cannot be presumed merely by the
asking of a question, that presumption should at least shift when an
objection to the question has been made on Self-Incrimination Clause
grounds. It seems that this would be a fair counterbalance to the
requirement that the invoker provide the information when it is requested
and only later seek to avoid its use against her.
ii. Fitness for Judicial Review
A dispute over whether compulsion has been utilized, unlike the other
types of disputes that have been addressed, can be considered fit for judicial
review at the time the alleged compulsion is used. This is because the
question is wholly independent of the information the witness has been
asked to disclose. Whether it constitutes compulsion for the government to
exact the loss of employment as the price for exercising the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination appears to be a pure question of law.
This question of law is separable from whether the witness succumbed to
the pressure, what she said as a result, or whether and to what extent it
formed a link in the chain of evidence against her. The same appears to be
true of any other detriment the government could impose or benefit it could
refuse to confer. Thus, this consideration weighs in favor of treating as ripe
disputes over whether compulsion has been employed.
173 See supra note 172.
174 See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 37-38 (2002) (plurality opinion) (opining that
"[a] prison clinical rehabilitation program" requiring convicted sex offenders to admit all
prior sex crimes does not utilize compulsion "if the adverse consequences an inmate faces
for not participating are related to the program objectives and do not constitute atypical and
significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life"); id at 50-51
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (opining that "restrictions on the personal
property [an inmate] can keep in his cell, a reduction in his visitation privileges, a reduction
in the amount of money he can spend in the canteen, and a reduction in the wage he can earn
through prison employment" were too "minor" to constitute compulsion).
"' See, e.g., id at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court had never before
"held that a person who has made a valid assertion of the privilege may nevertheless be
ordered to incriminate himself and sanctioned for disobeying such an order").
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However, it seems that both hardship and fitness must be sufficiently
shown to render a dispute ripe for review. 176 And even if some compromise
were permitted, it would likely operate to excuse a more sparse factual
record where hardship considerations demonstrate "a compelling need for
immediate judicial review. ' '177 This is "[b]ecause the hardship requirement
is constitutionally based," whereas fitness is deemed to be a prudential
concern, so "in all likelihood [the former] is less flexible., 178 Accordingly,
disputes over whether the government's actions constitute compulsion, even
though they might be fit for judicial review, should be deemed unripe until
criminal proceedings have been initiated.
d. Disputes Over the Scope of Immunity
Finally, the dispute could center around whether the scope of
immunity is sufficient to supplant the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. In one sense, the early adjudication model is wholly
unavailable here. Since the law is relatively well settled that a witness is
entitled to use-plus-derivative-use immunity, the only issues that remain
address implementation of this standard. That is, the only remaining
dispute is over whether any particular piece of evidence or non-evidentiary
material deriving from the compelled statement is immunized from use.
Even under current law, this is addressed, and can only be addressed, once
criminal proceedings have been instituted and the government knows what
evidence it wishes to set forth against the witness-turned-defendant.
Suppose, however, that Congress takes the lead from some in the
academic community who have argued that mere use immunity is sufficient
to supplant the privilege 179 and passes a statute providing that all immunity
hereinafter granted by any of its committees will be mere use immunity.
Suppose further that our hypothetical Congressional committee witness is
the first to be granted such immunity in exchange for her testimony and she
chooses to dispute that the scope of the immunity granted is equivalent to
the constitutional privilege it purports to replace.
176 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.3; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) (holding claim to be unripe despite the fact that it addressed a pure legal issue). But
see LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 80 (2d ed. 1987) (suggesting that
either hardship or fitness is sufficient to make a claim ripe for review).
177 CHEMERINsKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.3.
178 Id.
179 See supra text accompanying note 157.
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i. Hardship to the Witness
As with the other types of disputes addressed, such a witness cannot
claim hardship from being required to wait and litigate her claim later.
First, she suffers no injury to her Self-Incrimination Clause rights from
being required to answer the committee's questions, something she would
have to do even if the immunity were broader. This is because, again, the
Clause is violated only when the compelled statement or, arguably, its fruits
are used against her criminally. Second, such injury is again not inevitable
because the nature of prosecutorial discretion renders the possibility of
injury highly speculative.
Indeed, the postponed adjudication model would render formal grants
of immunity utterly superfluous. Pursuant to such a model, whenever the
witness is compelled to divulge over her objection information that turns
out to be incriminatory, immunity automatically attaches to anything she
says. Since immunity need never be granted formally, there likewise need
not be any immediate litigation over the scope of that immunity. It seems
completely natural that such litigation should await a future date, if that date
ever even comes.
ii. Fitness for Judicial Review
On the other hand, the issue concerning the scope of immunity, in the
rare case that it arises, is a purely legal one. Thus, it ought to be considered
fit for judicial review. Yet, for the reasons already discussed,180 such fitness
for review does not counterbalance the lack of any current or inevitable
injury to the witness requiring redress. Accordingly, even this type of
dispute ought not be addressed in the pre-prosecution mode.
C. RIPENESS UNDER DUKE POWER
As shown above, disputes regarding a claim of privilege pursuant to
the Self-Incrimination Clause generally do not satisfy traditional ripeness
requirements, at least under the two accepted theories of "hardship."
However, it is at least arguable that such disputes can be considered ripe
pursuant to a third application of the "hardship" requirement: where
collateral injuries not the focus of the lawsuit are inevitable or have already
occurred. In such cases, the injuries stemming from the arguably invalid
government action are unrelated to the arguable invalidity of the
government's conduct.1 81 Yet such a theory of ripeness has been endorsed
by the Supreme Court in but a single, exceptional case-Duke Power v.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 176-78.
181 See CHEMEwrNSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.2.
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Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. 182-that can most charitably be
described as an outlier and which does not conform to any generally
acceptable notion of ripeness. To see why, an extensive discussion of that
case is required.
In Duke Power, an environmental group, a labor union, and residents
who lived near the sites of two planned nuclear power plants sued the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to invalidate the Price-Anderson Act.183
That Act,184 in essence, limited total liability for a nuclear accident to $560
million, irrespective of whether damage to life, health, and property would
actually exceed that amount.185 The plaintiffs made essentially two claims:
first, they argued that the Act arbitrarily interfered with their property rights
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by
artificially truncating the compensation that would be due them should a
nuclear accident occur;186 and second, they claimed "that in the event of a
nuclear accident their property would be 'taken' without any assurance of
just compensation" in violation of the Takings Clause of the same
Amendment.' 87 While no such accident had yet occurred, the plaintiffs
alleged that a number of injuries would inevitably occur if the nuclear
plants were merely built, such as an increase in the temperature of two
nearby lakes used for recreational purposes due to the use of lake water to
cool the reactor, and the emission of low levels of non-natural radiation into
the environment. 18 8 The lawsuit was premised on the theory that without
the limitation-of-liability provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, nuclear
power plants would not be built because of industry concern over potential
liability in case of accident, and these alleged injuries would not occur. 189
Even though no nuclear accident had occurred, triggering the liability-
limiting provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, the Court held that the
claims were ripe. Having already held that the plaintiffs had standing
because of the injuries that were alleged to be inevitable, 190 the Court held,
in a matter of two sentences, that those same injuries were sufficient to
satisfy the "hardship" requirement of the ripeness test. Opining that the
182 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
113 Id. at 67. The plaintiffs also sued the utility planning to construct the plants, but the
Court held that its "presence or absence [in the suit] makes no material difference to [the]
consideration of the merits." Id. at 72 n. 16.
184 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (2000).
185 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 64-67.
186 Id. at 69.
187 id.
188 Id. at 72-74.
189 Id. at 69, 74-75.
190 This conclusion, while dubious, is beyond the scope of this article.
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ripeness issue "need not long detain" the Court, it held that its "conclusion
that [the plaintiffs] will sustain immediate injury from the operation of the
disputed power plants" satisfied the hardship requirement.' 9 ' Thus, "while
the primary injury that was the focus of the lawsuit was not ripe-
uncompensated losses from a nuclear accident-other injuries existed to
make the case justiciable.' ' 92
Analogously, with respect to our hypothetical Congressional
committee witness, one might construct a persuasive argument to show that
hardship within the meaning of Duke Power will occur if she is required to
make disclosures of information without a promise of immunity. Pursuant
to such a theory of hardship, the witness undoubtedly suffers some hardship
by being required to answer the committee's questions even over a proper
claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege. She may well suffer ostracism
from her community, ignominy amongst her friends, family, and
colleagues, and all the other tangible and intangible effects that flow from
disclosure of involvement in criminal activity. Indeed, that is likely why
most witnesses when asked to incriminate themselves would prefer not to,
even if they could be assured that the answers will never be used against
them. Moreover, without a contemporaneous grant of immunity, the
witness will suffer the anxiety of not knowing whether her words will be
used against her. Of course, the Supreme Court has long held that the Self-
Incrimination Clause protects only against the prospect of a future
prosecution, not loss of reputation and the like.193 Nonetheless, pursuant to
Duke Power, damage to these ancillary interests, even though not
themselves protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause, might be sufficient
to render ripe the disputed claim of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.
However, Duke Power has been roundly criticized for stretching the
concept of ripeness beyond all recognition. The central vice of the decision
is that it conflated the separate ripeness and standing inquiries by holding
that the allegedly inevitable injury that was sufficient to give the plaintiffs
standing was also sufficient to make their claim ripe for review, even
though those injuries were completely unrelated to their claim.1 94  The
plaintiffs alleged injury in fact from the threatened operation of the nuclear
plants in the form of an increase in the emission of non-natural radiation
191 Id. at 81.
192 CHEMERINKSY, supra note 114, § 2.4.2.
193 See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896) ("The design of the
constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to protect
him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal charge.").
194 See Varat, supra note 12, at 298.
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and in the temperature of the lakes they used for recreation. But they did
not, and could not, claim any legal right to be free from these effects. The
only legal right they claimed, the right not to be arbitrarily under-
compensated in the case of a nuclear accident, was in no way in any danger
and was wholly unrelated to the types of injuries that gave them standing. 95
As Professor Varat has cogently observed:
Duke Power shifted the focus from the certainty of occurrence of the allegedly
unlawful conduct to the certainty of occurrence of the concrete injury that gives the
plaintiff a personal stake in the outcome of the case. The shift equates ripeness with
standing and permits adjudication of claims of right-even though injury to those
rights is not and may never be threatened-if a favorable decision could prevent
injury of another kind.196
If ripeness is to be differentiated from standing, "the Court must focus
on harm to the rights claimed to be unlawfully disregarded," for "[r]ipeness
is meaningful" as an inquiry separate and apart from standing "only if
applied to the issue raised in the case."'1 97 Of course, in the run of cases, the
alleged injury that confers standing on the plaintiffs will be the same
alleged injury that is asserted to make the claim ripe.' 98 However, "[i]n the
rare case like Duke Power" where this is not true, "the inquiries are separate
and should be treated as such."' 199
195 See id. ("[T]he Court held the constitutional dimension of ripeness satisfied by the
imminence of the injury that gave the plaintiffs standing, instead of requiring the imminence
of injury to the legal rights asserted in the suit."); id at 303 ("The imminent threat of
environmental injury to the plaintiffs did not make any more likely the events that might
threaten injury to the due process rights asserted in the suit."); see also Floyd, supra note
114, at 927 ("The only immediate injury was unrelated to any arguable claim of right by the
plaintiffs. And their only arguable claim of right-application of the limitation of liability
provision-was not ripe.").
196 Varat, supra note 12, at 279.
197 Id. at 304; see also Floyd, supra note 114, at 931 (arguing that the Court's ruling
violated the general principle that the injury upon which jurisdiction rests must "have some
logical nexus with the statute or constitutional provision relied upon").
198 See Varat, supra note 12, at 304.
199 Id. Duke Power has also been criticized for grossly misapplying not only the
hardship dimension of ripeness but the fitness aspect as well. The Court addressed the
constitutionality of the limitation-of-liability provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, even
though these provisions would be triggered only by an actual nuclear accident, and even
though it was entirely speculative not only whether such an accident would ever occur, but
also what the resultant injury would be. This is conjecture squared. Most striking is the
disconnect in the Court's ripeness discussion, in which it brushed aside claims that the
factual record was inadequate for such a weighty determination, and its discussion of the
merits, in which it acknowledged the difficulties of determining such a claim in advance of a
catastrophe. See Varat, supra note 12, at 307 ("The Court's assessment in Duke Power that
it had at the time of its decision as many of the factual tools as it would have had if it had
awaited application of the Price-Anderson limitation is strikingly unpersuasive, given the
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It should come as little surprise, then, that Duke Power has been
largely dismissed by the academic community as anomalous. A "principled
application of the Court's articulated justiciability doctrine would have
very terms in which the Court framed its holding."). Thus, in its discussion of ripeness, the
Court wrote, "Although it is true that no nuclear accident has yet occurred and that such an
occurrence would eliminate much of the existing scientific uncertainty surrounding this
subject, it would not... significantly advance [the Court's] ability to deal with the legal
issues presented nor aid... in their resolution." Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 81-82. Yet, in its
discussion of the merits, the Court's reasoning clearly indicates that a firmer factual context
would indeed help it resolve the issues. The Court acknowledged that there was
"considerable uncertainty as to the amount of damages which would result from a
catastrophic nuclear accident," id. at 84 n.28, uncertainty that would no doubt vanish if such
an accident ever occurred. The Court rejected the argument that the $560 million cap was
arbitrary because "whatever ceiling figure is selected will, of necessity, be arbitrary in the
sense that any choice of a figure based on imponderables like those at issue here can always
be so characterized." Id. at 86. Yet, the Court would be in a much stronger position to
determine whether the liability cap was truly arbitrary in the aftermath of a disaster when the
true amount of damages would no longer be "imponderable[]." In a similar vein, the Court
declared that "the hard truth is that no one can ever know" if "the $560 million fund would
not insure full recovery in all conceivable circumstances." Id. at 84-85. Of course, it was
irrelevant whether the compensation would be adequate "in all conceivable circumstances,"
instead of the circumstances that actually arise; and when they did arise, the answer to this
question obviously would be known. See Varat, supra note 12, at 305 ("After an accident,
the Court would have known the actual disparity between the damage caused by the accident
and the amount of compensation afforded by the Price-Anderson scheme."). In addition, at
the time a nuclear accident occurred, the liability cap of Price-Anderson might be altered or
even repealed altogether. See id. at 305-06. Likewise, the Court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that the waiver of defenses on the part of the utility companies required by the Act in
exchange for the liability limitation was of no use because the utilities had no defenses under
state tort law: "Since there has never been.., a case arising out of a nuclear incident like
those covered by the Price-Anderson Act, any discussion of the standard of liability that state
courts will apply is necessarily speculative." Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 91. Again, if the
Court had waited until such an incident actually occurred, and the Price-Anderson Act had
been pled as a defense to a state tort suit, much of this uncertainty would have disappeared as
well. See Varat, supra note 12, at 305 ("After an accident [t]he Court would have known
what realistic alternate sources of recovery would have been available to future plaintiffs
absent Price-Anderson-[a] set of facts that probably will vary over time."). Finally, and
"particularly troubling," id. at 307, the Court depended on the fact that "in the event of such
an incident, Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief provisions to provide additional
relief." Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 85. This assumption was based on a supposed
"commitment" in the Act requiring Congress to examine other avenues of redress in the
event of a catastrophe. Yet, the Court had no idea how a future Congress would react to a
disaster. "If the Court was truly as able to decide without knowing how Congress would
react as it would be with that knowledge," then, presumably, Price-Anderson is
constitutional no matter what a future Congress does. Varat, supra note 12, at 307. And if
so, "one wonders why the Court took comfort in the existence of [Congress's] statutory
commitment" in deciding that the Act is constitutional. Id. Thus, the Court's own
determination of the merits in Duke Power demonstrates how far off the mark its fitness
determination was. In light of its prior cases, this determination was "something of a
mystery." Id.
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compelled the Court to find the case nonjusticiable on... ripeness
grounds.,200  The Court reached the decision it did only by altering "its
general view of justiciability. 201 Professor Varat has concluded that "the
[C]ourt was unjustified in acting this way,"202 and that Duke Power is
"untenable on its own terms."20 3 Professor Floyd has bluntly concurred:
"The Court's approach in Duke Power was fundamentally in error. 20 4
It is commonly accepted that the result in Duke Power flowed from
purely political considerations. The district court had struck down the
Price-Anderson Act on the grounds advanced by the plaintiffs.20 5 Had the
Supreme Court merely reversed with directions to dismiss based purely on
justiciability grounds, a constitutional shadow on the Act would have
remained. The constitutionality of the Act might have remained in doubt
until the extraordinary circumstance of a nuclear accident had occurred,
seriously curtailing the principal benefit of the Act, which was to assure
putative private investors in nuclear power that their liability was limited in
case of disaster. Moreover, while no suit could have been brought in
federal court until such a disaster occurred, a dismissal on justiciability
grounds would have left open the possibility that a state court, not bound by
Article III justiciability constraints,20 6 might have agreed with the
constitutional analysis of the district court.207 Such an invalidation of the
Act would have remained unreviewable by the Supreme Court.208
Thus, the result in Duke Power can best be explained as a consequence
of the Court's "desire to remove the constitutional doubts raised by the
district court's judgment of unconstitutionality ' 20 9  and "place a
constitutional stamp of approval on [the] important federal policy"
manifested in the Price-Anderson Act.210 It appears that "the Court was
200 Varat, supra note 12, at 278.
201 id.
202 Id. at 280.
203 Id. at 279.
204 Floyd, supra note 114, at 927; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 150 (4th ed. 1996) (arguing
that Duke Power is "virtually impossible to reconcile with prior authority").
205 See Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. Duke Power Co., 431 F. Supp. 203, 222-23
(W.D.N.C. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
206 See supra note 12.
207 See Varat, supra note 12, at 308-14.
208 Id. at 310-12; see Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
209 Varat, supra note 12, at 309.
210 Id. at 278; FALLON ET AL., supra note 204, at 150 (arguing that Duke Power is "most
plausibly explained as responsive to ad hoc considerations - especially the desire to reverse
on the merits the district court's ruling that an important federal statute was
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motivated by its perception of the public interest in prompt resolution of the
constitutionality of the limitation of liability provision," and not by a
principled application of the ripeness doctrine.211 However understandable
212the reasons for the decision, it seems clear that Duke Power was "sui
generis and not likely to be followed in its seemingly logical
implications."
21 3
In short, our hypothetical Congressional committee witness has only
Duke Power on her side when it comes to arguing why her disputed claim
under the Self-Incrimination Clause is ripe for review. Yet Duke Power is a
sui generis case, limited to its facts, and driven by political considerations
beyond the scope of proper judicial decision-making. It has been attacked
in the commentary and all but ignored in the case law. Accordingly, a Duke
Power theory does not provide the hardship necessary to render a dispute
214
over the Self-Incrimination Clause ripe for review.
unconstitutional"); see also Varat, supra note 12, at 315 ("[T]here is ample reason to think
the Court wanted to decide Duke Power in order to approve Price-Anderson.").
211 Floyd, supra note 114, at 927; see also Varat, supra note 12, at 303 ("Duke Power...
is actually a departure from all its predecessors.").
212 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 95 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I can understand the Court's willingness to
reach the merits of this case and thereby remove the doubt which has been cast over this
important federal statute."); id. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I
cannot ... criticize the statesmanship of the Court's decision to provide the country with an
advisory opinion on an important subject. Nevertheless,... [w]e are not statesmen; we are
judges.").
213 Varat, supra note 12, at 309; see also id. at 326 (asserting that Duke Power is a so-
called "[that] day and train only" decision) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669
(1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)).
214 In what appears to be the only reported post-Chavez analysis by a federal court of the
ripeness of a Self-Incrimination Clause dispute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit fell into the "Duke Power trap." In United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1130-
31 (9th Cir. 2005), the defendant claimed that the government's revocation of probation
violated his rights pursuant to the Self-Incrimination Clause because the revocation was
based on his "refus[al] to incriminate himself as part of his sex offender treatment" that was
a condition of his probation. The district court had held that Antelope's "objection...
would not be ripe until [he were] 'prosecuted or subject to prosecution' for additional
crimes," if he were to reveal any. Id. at 1132. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. However, while
purporting to conduct a ripeness inquiry, the court merely held that Antelope had standing.
See id. (identifying the issue as "whether Antelope suffered an injury in fact"). Without
citing to Duke Power, the court repeated the fallacy of that decision by basing its ripeness
determination, not on whether Antelope had suffered injury to an interest protected by the
Self-Incrimination Clause, as properly understood, but on whether he had suffered any
injury. See id. at 1133 ("[H]e has already suffered the very serious and non-hypothetical
injury of imprisonment after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right.").
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D. RIPENESS LESSONS FROM THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Pursuant to traditional ripeness principles, many disputes over the
Self-Incrimination Clause are not ripe when the claim of the constitutional
privilege is asserted. This conclusion is reinforced by comparing that
Clause to its Fifth Amendment neighbor, the Takings Clause. While
addressing very different concerns, the two share a common characteristic:
each is "bifurcated," insofar as each is violated only if the government has
taken two separate actions.
The Takings Clause provides that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation., 215 It is clear from the face of
the Clause that two governmental actions must coalesce before the Clause
has been violated: first, the government must take property; second, it must
refuse to render "just compensation. 2 16 Suppose that a taking has clearly
occurred but that it cannot fairly be said that the government has refused to
pay just compensation, because no compensation has been sought through
the means made available by the government. Any claim for a violation of
the Takings Clause in such a situation should be deemed unripe.217
This application of the ripeness doctrine was first fully explicated by
the Supreme Court in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.2 18 There, the owner of land who planned
to develop it as a residential subdivision sued a local planning commission,
claiming that the commission had "taken" the land through the application
of strict zoning laws and regulations.21 9 The Court determined that the
claim was unripe for review because the developer had "not yet.., utilized
the procedures [the State] provide[d] for obtaining just compensation.9
2 0
21' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896). As
used in this article, "Takings Clause" refers to both the incorporated and unincorporated
versions of the Clause.
216 As the Court wrote in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 330,
348 (1996), a "regulatory takings claim.., has two components. First, [the property owner]
must establish that the regulation has in substance 'taken' his property .... Second, [he]
must demonstrate that any proffered compensation is not 'just."'
217 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.3, at 109.
21s 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
219 Id. at 175.
220 Id, at 186. The Court also held the claim unripe for review for a separate and
independent reason: the developer had "not yet obtained a final decision regarding the
application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property." Id. That is,
the developer had not yet proved that there had been a "taking." This aspect of the ripeness
doctrine in the Takings Clause context has been developed separately from the application of
the ripeness doctrine with which this article is primarily concerned. See, e.g., Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618-21 (2001); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520
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The Court explained that "because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings
without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just
compensation has been denied., 221  Thus, if the government provides a
process by which compensation may be obtained, and "if resort to that
process 'yield[s] just compensation,"' the Constitution has not been
violated.222 Where a property owner has not yet "used the procedure and
been denied just compensation," its constitutional rights have not been
violated and its Takings Clause claim is unripe for review in federal
court.223 On the other hand, a Takings Clause issue becomes ripe in this
U.S. 725, 734 (1997); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 348-49; Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980). See generally R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal
Land Use Cases from Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 101 (1994).
While this strand of the ripeness doctrine is interesting in its own right, its usefulness is
limited in understanding how the ripeness doctrine should be applied to Self-Incrimination
Clause disputes. That is because the question of whether a taking has occurred is most
directly analogous, in the Self-Incrimination Clause context, to the question of whether a
statement has been compelled. Yet, while the former tends to be convoluted and fact-
intensive, the latter is amenable to simpler and more categorical decision-making. See supra
Part III.B.3.c.ii.
This article focuses on the second aspect of the ripeness doctrine applied by the Court
to Takings Clause cases-that just compensation must be refused before a claim accrues-
because, as discussed below, it is directly analogous to this article's proposed rule that a
dispute over a claim of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is not ripe for
review unless and until there is an inevitable danger that a person's words will be used
against him or her in a criminal case. See infra notes 231-36 and accompanying text. Thus,
a fuller discussion of the other application of the ripeness doctrine to the Takings Clause is
beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent dissection of this area of the law, see
generally Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1995).
221 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13.
222 Id. at 194-95 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013 (1984))
(alteration in original); see also id. at 195 ("[T]he State's action ... is not 'complete' until
the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking."); City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 714 (1999) ("If the condemnation
proceedings do not.., deny the landowner just compensation, the government's actions are
neither unconstitutional nor unlawful."); Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734 ("[I]f a State provides an
adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied
just compensation.") (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195) (internal quotation marks
omitted); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 350 ("[A] court cannot determine
whether a municipality has failed to provide 'just compensation' until it knows what, if any,
compensation the responsible administrative body intends to provide."); Hodel, 452 U.S. at
297 n.40 ("[A]n alleged taking is not unconstitutional unless just compensation is
unavailable.").
223 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195; see also Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness
Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL.
W. L. REv. 1, 9, 23 (1992).
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sense when the government makes clear its intention not to provide just
compensation:
Although the government acts lawfully when, pursuant to proper authorization, it
takes property and provides just compensation, the government's action is lawful
solely because it assumes a duty, imposed by the Constitution, to provide just
compensation. When the government repudiates this duty, either by denying just
compensation in fact or by refusing to provide procedures through which
compensation may be sought, it violates the Constitution.
This application of the ripeness doctrine makes perfect sense in
traditional ripeness terms.225 First, applying hardship analysis, one must ask
whether the case involves the promulgation of a statute or regulation that
forces the landowner to choose between forgoing his rights and risking
prosecution or other sanctions. Clearly, this is not such a case: that the
government has taken property does not unlawfully put the landowner to
such a choice. Indeed, he need not do anything at all but wait for the
government to either pay him just compensation or refuse to do so. 2 26 Until
the government takes the latter course, it has not done anything "wrong."
Moreover, until the government clearly signals its intent to fail to render
just compensation, expressly or through inaction, there is no inevitability
that this will occur and, hence, no hardship to the landowner of waiting.22 7
224 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 717 (citations omitted).
225 It bears mention, however, that four Justices have recently indicated their belief that
this aspect of Williamson County should be reconsidered. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City
of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2507 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment); see also Kassouni, supra note 223,
at 3 (arguing that traditional ripeness analysis "has been largely ignored by courts when
constitutional property rights are at issue").
226 Kassouni argues that there is a "potential 'chilling effect' on private property rights if
owners are required to spend years in court without any assurance that their just
compensation claims will even be reviewed." Kassouni, supra note 223, at 22. Kassouni
does not identify how that "chilling effect" manifests itself, but presumably the principal
such effect is that landowners are chilled from developing their land in the way they want
until the land-use regulations in question have been determined to have effected a taking
without just compensation. Whatever validity this observation has with respect to the first
Williamson County ripeness requirement, it is inapposite with respect to the second. Where
the landowner's position is that his property has been taken and he awaits just compensation,
he has no further development rights in the property that can be "chilled"; the land-use
regulations are valid. The only question is: who pays for them, the landowner or the
government? See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 744 (noting that the landowner sought "not to be free
of the [land use] regulations but to be paid for their consequences"). Of course, if the
government loses the suit, it may rescind the regulation in response rather than continue to
pay, allowing the landowner to once again exercise his development rights. But that is
entirely up to the government; it is not an option to which the landowner has any right.
227 Kassouni argues that this ripeness requirement for Takings Clause claims "effectively
close[s] the federal courthouse doors to aggrieved property owners," because any state level
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Even if hardship could be shown, however, just compensation claims
are paradigmatically unfit for judicial review. The very notion of "just
compensation" makes resolution of the case turn on the distinct
characteristics of the unique piece of property that has been taken. As the
Court has noted: "[V]aluation issues peculiarly require a [well] developed
record .... Without evidence of actual figures supporting various valuation
theories, a court is not able to discern 'what legal issues it is deciding, what
effect its decision will have on the adversaries, [or] some useful purpose to
be achieved in deciding them."' 228 Where property has already undergone
some valuation process pursuant to existing state proceedings, a court
reviewing such a record is in a far better position than one starting
essentially from scratch. Of course, in many cases the government's
determination of what is "just compensation" will be zero, because its
position will be that no taking has occurred at all. However, the benefits of
allowing local authorities, who are presumably more attuned to local
conditions and markets, to have the first opportunity to make the initial
valuation229 in cases where only the compensation issue is contested
arguably justify the establishment of a bright-line rule requiring the initial
resort to those authorities in all cases.
decision affording inadequate compensation would be entitled to res judicata effect and
therefore immune from review. Kassouni, supra note 223, at 43, 44. This argument suffers
from three flaws. First, it assumes that whatever mechanism the state has in place to
determine just compensation claims would be an inverse condemnation proceeding, which is
judicial in nature and entitled to res judicata effect. However, the procedure might just as
readily take some other form. Second, in the Takings Clause context, as with any federal
issue, ultimate resort can, at least in theory, be had in one federal court: the U.S. Supreme
Court. See San Remo Hotel, 125 S. Ct. at 2505 ("[Mlost of the cases in our takings
jurisprudence... came to us on writs of certiorari from state courts of last resort."). Finally,
and most importantly, the argument assumes that state judges are unwilling to apply, or
incapable of applying, federal law with fidelity. Yet, as the Court wrote just recently,
"[s]tate courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use
decisions." Id. at 2507. Moreover, in every other context, we presume the same: takings
jurisprudence "is not the only area of law in which [the Court] ha[s] recognized limits to
[the] ability to press ... federal claims in federal court." Id Indeed, motions to suppress
evidence in criminal cases are based largely on federal constitutional grounds, and yet we
entrust the overwhelming bulk of such decisions to state court judges every day of every
week of every year. Ultimately, it is Kassouni's distrust of state judges to follow federal law
that causes him concern, not any flaws in the Supreme Court's ripeness doctrine.
Irrespective of whether such a distrust is well founded, it certainly is not limited to the
Takings Clause context.
228 Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 146 (1974) (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952)).
229 See id. at 147 ("[Wle would necessarily be forced to a speculative interpretation of a
statute not clear on the subject of valuation before the court entrusted with its construction
has given us the benefit of its views.").
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Note, too, that this branch of the ripeness tree would not exist if Duke
Power had any vitality outside of the specific factual context in which it
was decided. A landowner could very easily make out an argument that his
claim is ripe for review pursuant to Duke Power even absent a denial of just
compensation. Again, pursuant to Duke Power, an issue may be deemed
ripe where injuries have resulted from arguably invalid government action
but those injuries are unrelated to the arguable invalidity of the
government's conduct. In the Takings Clause context, a landowner who is
unable to develop his or her land in such a way as to maximize its overall
utility has certainly been injured, just as the future neighbors of the nuclear
power plant in Duke Power were harmed by the threatened increase in
background radiation levels. Yet, just as the plaintiffs in Duke Power did
not even argue that they had a legal right to a certain background level of
radiation, the landowner cannot argue that he or she has any right under the
Takings Clause to make beneficial use of his or her property.230 The
landowner has only the right to compensation for his or her inability to do
so. Accordingly, the Takings Clause paradigm is further demonstration that
the Duke Power theory of ripeness is defunct.
When viewed through the lens of the ripeness doctrine, disputes over
the Self-Incrimination Clause start to look a lot like Takings Clause cases.
Just as two governmental actions must come together before a Takings
Clause claim accrues-the taking and the refusal to render just
compensation 231-so too must two governmental actions coalesce before a
dispute over the Self-Incrimination Clause matures: compulsion and
witnessing.232 Just as a Takings Clause plaintiff can demonstrate no
hardship-no present or inevitable deprivation of her constitutional
rights233-before the second of the two elements has occurred, neither can
the invoker of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination show
that his or her rights are currently or presently under attack until the "other
shoe has fallen." 234  And just as questions of valuation of property in
Takings Clause cases are paradigmatically unfit for judicial review until
local authorities, familiar with local conditions, have made their best
attempt to derive "just compensation," 235 so too are questions about
230 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
234 See supra Parts III.B.3.a.i, III.B.3.b.i, III.B.3.c.i, III.B.3.d.i.
235 See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
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arguably self-incriminating statements generally too abstract for resolution
when divorced from the context of a criminal case against their maker.236
Yet, while the Supreme Court has utilized the ripeness doctrine to
require that the federal courts avoid deciding Takings Clause cases before
the disputes have fully matured, the Court has affirmatively encouraged
abstract and premature decision-making in the Self-Incrimination Clause
realm. Chavez v. Martinez2 37 represents a step in the right direction. One
can only hope that the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court,
follow that decision to its logical conclusion and begin to employ a
principled application of the ripeness doctrine to disputes over claims of the
Self-Incrimination Clause.238
E. SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE CASES AND THE GOALS OF THE
RIPENESS DOCTRINE
It appears that application of the ripeness doctrine to disputes over
claims of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination should
generally result in postponed adjudication of those disputes. This
conclusion is reinforced when we look back over the goals of the ripeness
doctrine and recognize that these goals are realized by a strict application of
the doctrine to Self-Incrimination Clause disputes.
As with other justiciability requirements, the ripeness doctrine seeks to
advance both separation-of-powers and federalism concerns. 239 Application
of the doctrine to disputes over claims of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination serves these twin goals. Thus, in our main
example of the Congressional committee witness who claims the privilege,
under current law, the committee must stop what it is doing and have a
federal court-which may be quite unfamiliar with the committee's work-
decide whether the witness may be required to answer. If not, the court will
then put the committee to the choice of either formally granting the witness
immunity or attempting to obtain the information it seeks from another
source. Pursuant to a robust application of the ripeness doctrine, the
committee must essentially make the same decision,240 but without the
annoyance and inconvenience visited upon them by the interference of a
236 See supra Parts III.B.3.a.ii, III.B.3.b.ii.
237 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (plurality opinion); see supra Part II.A.
238 But see United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying
superficial ripeness analysis).
239 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 151.
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federal court.241 Moreover, the friction between the judicial and legislative
branches occasioned by the early adjudication model is quite likely
unnecessary, for it may well be that no prosecution will ever be brought.
2 42
So, too, would a robust application of the ripeness doctrine to disputes
over claims of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination further
federalism concerns. Under current law, a person may bring a civil suit in
federal court claiming that a state or local government has unlawfully meted
out punishment or refused to confer a benefit based on the civil plaintiffs
refusal to make self-incriminating statements.243 As is the case any time a
federal court sits in judgment over the constitutionality of the actions of a
local authority, the potential for friction is manifest. Application of the
ripeness doctrine reduces that friction considerably. First, again, it is quite
likely that no charges will ever be brought against the civil plaintiff, so
resolution of the dispute becomes wholly unnecessary. For example, in
McKune v. Lile, the Court addressed the merits of the Self-Incrimination
Clause dispute despite the fact that no criminal prosecution had ever been
brought as a result of self-incriminatory statements arguably compelled by
the state's sexual offender rehabilitation program. 44 Second, if charges are
brought, the overwhelming likelihood is that they will be brought in state,
not federal, court, and it is the state court that will have the opportunity to
rule on the Self-Incrimination Clause issue in the form of a motion to
suppress. Accordingly, in the overwhelming majority of cases, no federal
court will ever have to get involved in the dispute. The benefits to a healthy
federal system of the application of the ripeness doctrine in this context are
obvious.245
F. A CAVEAT ABOUT GRAND JURIES
It is at least arguable that the ripeness analysis described above does
not apply to claims of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
241 See O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2544 ("[T]he separation of powers doctrine prohibits
the courts from interfering with Congress's legitimate exercise of its power to compel
testimony in support of its constitutional prerogatives."); see also Nichol, supra note 113, at
162 ("[T]he ripeness requirement has been used.., to allow the challenged government
action to run its course more completely.").
242 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 114, § 2.4.1, at 101 ("Ripeness advances separation of
powers by avoiding judicial review in situations where it is unnecessary for the federal
courts to become involved ... ").
243 See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30-32 (2002) (plurality opinion).
244 See id. at 34 (plurality opinion).
245 See Nichol, supra note 113, at 177 ("[T]he ripeness formula... allows the courts to
postpone interfering when necessary so that other branches of government, state and federal,
may perform their functions unimpeded.").
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made in the grand jury, and that current law, which adjudicates disputes
over such claims at the time the claim is made, is actually correct. The
above analysis dictates that claims of the Fifth Amendment privilege in the
context of a legislative or administrative hearing are not ripe for review
until criminal proceedings are initiated against the invoker. This is because
a "witness" before a legislative or administrative agency is not the same
type of "witness" with which the Fifth Amendment is concerned. The Self-
Incrimination Clause speaks of a witness "in any criminal case," and a
legislative or administrative agency hearing is hardly a "criminal case." A
legislative or administrative agency hearing witness becomes a witness in a
"criminal case" only when criminal proceedings are instituted against her.
But when does that "criminal case" actually begin? Depending on the
answer to that question, the above analysis might not apply to claims of the
privilege made in the grand jury: arguably, a grand jury witness is a
"witness" "in [a] criminal case."
In Chavez v. Martinez, the plurality declined to "decide... the precise
moment when a 'criminal case' commences. ' 46  It decided only "that
police questioning does not constitute a 'case' any more than a private
investigator's precomplaint activities constitute a 'civil case."'' 247 Based on
this passage alone, one might conclude that grand jury proceedings are not
part of a "criminal case." First, there is the analogy to civil cases and the
"precomplaint activities" of a private investigator. If "precomplaint"
proceedings are not part of a "civil case," then, by analogy, "pre-
indictment" proceedings are not part of a "criminal case." If a civil case
does not begin until a complaint is filed, then a criminal case does not begin
until an indictment is filed.
Second, there is the analogy between "police questioning" and the role
of the grand jury. Modem police investigations perform a role historically
undertaken by grand juries. While most investigations today are performed
by law enforcement officials, and grand jury proceedings occur only after
an investigation is virtually complete, in an earlier age, in which there were
no professional police forces, the bulk of the investigative work was
performed by the grand jury itself.248 Thus, one might argue that, just as a
246 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (plurality opinion).
247 Id.
248 See Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in
the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1, 15 (2002). Simmons notes that
[flor centuries after their inception, grand juries operated in a legal and political context in which
there were no police force and no prosecutor-in other words, a criminal justice system with no
neutral professionals to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the various legal,
political, social, and moral considerations involved in charging an individual with a crime.
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police investigation does not open a "criminal case," neither does its
analogue, a grand jury investigation.
However, there is good reason to think that the grand jury process
itself is part of the "criminal case., 249  Although the Fifth Amendment
speaks of the "criminal case," the Sixth Amendment addresses "criminal
prosecutions. 250 Unless we are to assume that the framers and ratifiers of
the Bill of Rights used language carelessly and erratically, we must assume
that the two terms are not interchangeable, especially since they appear in
contiguous provisions of the same document. Moreover, the term "criminal
case" appears to be broader. The Sixth Amendment is uniquely concerned
with trial rights: for example, that trial be public, that a jury determine guilt
or innocence, that the defendant be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses
against him, and that he have competent counsel. 251 The Sixth Amendment
generally does not apply until formal charges have already been brought.252
In short, the Sixth Amendment states that one has the right not to be
convicted unless certain conditions are met.
The Fifth Amendment has a broader scope. 53 It states, at least in part,
that one is not even to be tried unless certain conditions are met. If these
conditions are not satisfied, an accused is entitled to dismissal even before
Id.
249 The Supreme Court long ago wrote that a "case before [a] grand jury [is] a criminal
case." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). However, in the very next
paragraph, the Court wrote that the Self-Incrimination Clause "insure[s] that a person not be
compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might
tend to show that he himself had committed a crime." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it is
unclear whether the Counselman Court subscribed to the view suggested here that self-
incriminating testimony could not even be compelled in a grand jury proceeding or, on the
contrary, this was an early, if imprecise, expression of the conventional view that self-
incriminating testimony that was compelled in the grand jury-as in "any [other]
investigation"-could not be used in a later prosecution. O'Neill comes to the former
conclusion, but with little analysis. O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2470 ("[A] grand jury
proceeding.., doubtless qualifies as being part of a 'criminal case.').
250 The Sixth Amendment provides for a number of rights enjoyed by the accused "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
251 The Court has held that a defendant is entitled to counsel at all "critical stages" of the
proceeding, some of which certainly occur before trial. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 695 (2002). However, the right to counsel is nonetheless essentially a trial right, for the
right to counsel before trial exists only to the extent that the lack of counsel at that time can
fatally affect the accused individual's trial rights. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52, 53 (1961) (noting that arraignment is a "critical stage" because "[a]vailable defenses may
be ... irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted").
252 See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
253 See Counselman, 142 U.S. at 563 ("A criminal prosecution under article 6 of the
amendments is much narrower than a 'criminal case,' under article 5 of the amendments.").
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the prosecution opens its case. Thus, the right to a grand jury indictment 54
is the right not to be prosecuted by anything less, and can be enforced
before conviction. 5  Likewise, the right to be free from double jeopardy256
is the right not to be prosecuted if one has already been acquitted or
convicted of the "same offense," and also can be enforced before trial.
257
Certainly, the Self-Incrimination Clause in part protects a trial right just as
those catalogued in the Sixth Amendment do.255 Yet, if that were all that
Clause protected, one would think that it should make its appearance in the
Sixth Amendment. It appears that the placement of the Self-Incrimination
Clause in the Fifth Amendment rather than the Sixth signifies that a
"criminal case" can exist before a "criminal prosecution[]" commences.25 9
Thus, it appears that the focus of the Fifth Amendment as a whole is in
protecting people from prosecution, and not simply-as the Sixth
Amendment does-from conviction. If so, it makes perfect sense to read
the Self-Incrimination Clause as requiring, at the very least, use immunity
in the grand jury itself that is, if a witness is compelled to make self-
incriminatory statements to a grand jury, she cannot be indicted by the same
grand jury but only by a grand jury that has not been tainted by those
statements. And because, by virtue of the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury
Clause,260 a grand jury indictment is a necessary precondition to a federal
prosecution, no compelled self-incriminatory statement, even if made
before a Congressional committee, can be used even to institute charges
against its maker.
254 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ...." U.S. CONST. amend V.
255 See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799, 802 (1989) (noting
that "a defect [in grand jury proceedings] so fundamental that it causes the grand jury no
longer to be a grand jury, or the indictment no longer to be an indictment, gives rise to the
constitutional right not to be tried," and therefore can be raised in an interlocutory appeal);
accord O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2482.
256 "No person shall be... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb...." U.S. CONST. amend V.
257 See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (holding that order denying
motion to dismiss indictment on grounds of double jeopardy was appealable on interlocutory
basis because defendant was "contesting the very authority of the Government to hale him
into court to face trial on the charge against him"); accord O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2482.
258 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; accord O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2482.
259 See O'Neill, supra note 28, at 2482 ("It could be argued... that the decision to place
the self-incrimination clause in the Fifth Amendment represented a conscious desire to
separate the trial rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment from the arguably pretrial
protections contained in the Fifth Amendment.").
260 See supra note 254.
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Pursuant to this theory, a dispute over the claim of the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination made in a grand jury proceeding
arguably is ripe for review at the time the claim is made and dishonored. At
the least, it is a much closer question-one this Article does not undertake
to answer-whether a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination made in the grand jury should be resolved right then and
there.
CONCLUSION
The Self-Incrimination Clause is in a state of flux. Conventional
wisdom holds that the Clause prohibits the government from compelling
self-incriminating statements from the unwilling. Thus, courts have
allowed Self-Incrimination Clause disputes to be adjudicated at the point of
compulsion, even if no "witnessing" in a "criminal case" has occurred or
ever will. Unfortunately, as is often the case, conventional wisdom here is
more conventional than it is wise. The plain language of the Clause, as
accurately discerned in Chavez v. Martinez,261 conflicts with this century-
old assumption about its scope. The Clause itself says only that no one can
be compelled to have her testimony used against her in a "criminal case,"
thus transforming her into a "witness." Chavez teaches that only
compulsion plus witnessing in a criminal case makes out a violation of the
Clause. Strict application of the ripeness doctrine demands that disputes
over the Clause be postponed until such compelled witnessing either has
occurred or is about to.
The defense bar will certainly resist the notion that claims of the Fifth
Amendment privilege cannot be adjudicated at the time they are made.
Indeed, prosecutors will likely be hesitant as well, for the procedure
proposed by this article is one to which all are unaccustomed. Yet those
who continue to adhere to the conventional thinking about the Self-
Incrimination Clause commit the grievous legal sin of "confound[ing] the
familiar with the necessary., 262  In this case, what is familiar-the
adjudication of unripe Self-Incrimination Clause disputes-is not only
unnecessary. It is also unconstitutional.
261 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (plurality opinion); see supra Part II.A.
262 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J, concurring).
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